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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 State of the marine environment 
The marine environment is under great pressure by human activities. In 2019, the 
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) - 
an independent intergovernmental body established by member states of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity1 (CBD) in 2012,2 published the most comprehensive global assessment of 
biodiversity to date.3 The results are disturbing. According to this report, only 3% the oceans is 
free from human pressure.4 Live coral cover on reefs has decreased with nearly 50% in the past 
150 years, the decline dramatically accelerating over the past two or three decades.5 Moreover, 
severe impacts to marine ecosystems are illustrated by 33% of fish stocks being classified as 
overexploited and over 55% of ocean area being subject to industrial fishing.6  
Alarming scientific reports about the collapse of biodiversity and ecosystems are nothing new, 
and gained attention from policymakers for decades. These efforts especially gained momentum 
in 1992, when the United Nations Conference on Environment & Development (UNCED) was 
held in Rio de Janerio. At this conference, ‘Agenda 21’ was adopted - a comprehensive plan of 
action to be taken in every area in which human impacts on the environment. One important 
tool that is embraced by Agenda 21 to protect the oceans, are Marine Protected Areas (MPAs).7 
Ten years after ‘Rio’, at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainability Development (also 
nicknamed ‘Rio+10’), the international community committed itself to establish a coherent 
network of MPAs by 2012.8 The COP of the CBD gave further content to this commitment in 
2004, by additionally setting the target to cover 10% of the marine and coastal environment by 
2012,9 which – due to slow progress, was later pushed back to 2020.10  
 
1 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993) 1760 
UNTS 69 
2 IPBES, “Summary for policymakers of the assessment report of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform 
on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services on pollinators, pollination and food production. Secretariat of the 
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services” (2016) Bonn, Germany, 
Available online: https://www.ipbes. net/assessment-reports/pollinators (accessed 5 August 2020) 24. 
3 Freestone D, Conserving biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (Brill Nijhoff 2019) ch 2, 49. 
4 IPBES report, supra note 2, 24. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 UN General Assembly ‘Report of the united nations conference on environment and development’. 
(A/CONF.151/26) 13 August 1992, par. 17.7. 
8 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002, Para. 32(c). 
9 CBD COP Decision VII/5 ‘Marine and coastal biological diversity’ (UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/5) 13 April 
2004. 
10 CBD COP Decision X/2 ‘The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’ 
(UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/2) 29 October 2010. 
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At the time of writing, this ‘deadline’ has expired once again and the goal of 10% coverage is 
still far away. Only 35 countries have reported that they currently meet this target,11 and global 
MPA coverage is at 7,4%.12 An important reason why these targets are continuously missed, is 
due to the slow progress with establishing MPAs in areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ). 
These areas cover approximately 64 percent of the earth’s surface, and contain some of the 
world’s most unique species and habitats.13 Only 1,2% of ABNJ are protected by MPAs.14 This 
is partly due to the legal framework that applies in ABNJ, which ultimately reflects the 
overarching mare liberum, or ‘freedom of the high seas’ principle.15 A common understanding 
in the international community that the existing legal framework in ABNJ is insufficient to 
protect biodiversity has led to the development of a new international legally binding instrument 
(ILBI) for biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ). Given the rapidly deteriorating 
state of the marine environment, the need for a comprehensive legal instrument through which 
the international community can establish high seas protected areas that are universally 
recognized and respected, is evident.  
There are, however, examples of areas where – regardless of this lacking legal framework, 
MPAs in ABNJ are being established. Perhaps the most prominent example is the North-East 
Atlantic, in the maritime area of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
of the North-East Atlantic16 (OSPAR Convention). As opposed to the global number of 1,2% 
MPA coverage in ABNJ, in the high seas maritime area of OSPAR, 8,9% is protected by 
MPAs.17 Given how active OSPAR is in ABNJ, the forthcoming new MPA governance 
framework of the BBNJ ILBI will have large consequences for OSPAR. Many questions can 
be raised in this regard. Will OSPAR benefit from this regime? How will the ILBI and OSPAR 
cooperate? And what are the strengths and weaknesses of these regimes? This thesis will 
analyze the MPA regimes of these instruments, in order to provide answers to these questions.  
 
11 Aichi Target 11, https://www.cbd.int/aichi-targets/target/11, accessed on 29 May 2020. 
12 Protected Planet Digital Report, available at: https://livereport.protectedplanet.net/chapter-2, based on World 
Database on Protected Areas (WDPA), jointly managed by UNEP-WCMC and IUCN. 
13 Kraabel K D, ‘The BBNJ PrepCom and Institutional Arrangements: The Hype about the Hybrid Approach’ in 
Nordquist M H, Moore J N, and Long R (eds) The marine environment and United Nations sustainable 
development goal 14: life below water (Brill Nijhoff 2019) 138. 
14 Protected Planet Digital Report, supra note 12. 
15 Mendenhall E et al, “A Soft Treaty, Hard to Reach: The Second Inter-Governmental Conference for 
Biodiversity beyond National Jurisdiction” (2019) 108 Marine Policy 103664, 1. 
16 Convention For The Protection Of The Marine Environment Of The North-East Atlantic, Paris, 22 September 
1992, in force 25 March 1998. 
17 8,9% of OSPAR’s maritime area, 40% of which is located is in ABNJ. Source: OSPAR Commission 2019, 




1.2 Purpose and scope of this thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess how synergies can be created between OSPAR and the 
BBNJ ILBI, in order to achieve effective and comprehensive MPA governance in ABNJ. There 
are two dimensions to this issue: An institutional- and a substantive dimension. The former 
entails the institutional dynamics between OSPAR and the BBNJ ILBI, which will be 
thoroughly analyzed in this thesis. The key question here is how these instruments will 
cooperate with each other, in each of the institutional models that are currently on the table in 
the BBNJ negotiations. The substantive element of this analysis relates to the MPA processes 
of OSPAR and the BBNJ ILBI. These regimes will be examined in detail, and their strengths 
and shortcomings are identified, in order to establish the key elements to effective MPA 
governance. 
The issues touched upon by the OSPAR Convention and the BBNJ ILBI go far beyond just 
MPAs. The scope of this thesis is, however, primarily limited to their respective MPA regimes 
in ABNJ, since this is area on which their mandates overlap. Besides this, attention will also be 
paid to their institutional characteristics and cooperation mechanisms. The other elements of 
the BBNJ ‘package’ (marine genetic resources; environmental impact assessments; capacity 
building and technology-transfer) thus fall outside the scope of this thesis. As for OSPAR, its 
activities within national jurisdiction, as well as its activities in ABNJ that are not related to 
MPAs, will not be discussed.  
1.3 Methodology 
This thesis examines the regime interaction between the BBNJ ILBI and OSPAR. According 
to Young, for understanding regime interaction it is required “to ‘face’ the complex issues that 
arise from the fragmentation and diversification of international law.”18 That is exactly what is 
done in this thesis in relation to the ILBI and OSPAR. In this analysis, what brings further 
complexity is the fact that it concerns future regime interaction. One inherent ambiguity to this 
research is the circumstance that the ILBI is still being negotiated. This analysis is therefore 
speculative, to some degree, and works with different scenarios.  
Trevisanut, Giannopoulos and Holst have proposed a three-fold approach to regime interaction 
research, with three analytical dimensions: Institutional, formal and substantive.19 This 
 
18 Young MA, Regime interaction in international law: facing fragmentation (Cambridge University Press 2012) 
ch 1, 1. 
19 Trevisanut S, Giannopoulos N and Holst RR, Regime interaction in ocean governance: problems, theories, 
and methods (Publications on Ocean Development, Volume: 91, Brill Nijhoff 2020) ch 8, 223. 
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approach is adopted in the research that is conducted in this thesis, in the following manner. 
The first two dimensions of this three-fold approach are embodied in the analysis of the 
institutional relationship between the ILBI and OSPAR. This analysis looks at both the (future) 
institutional and the formal relationships between these bodies. The next part of the analysis 
focusses on the substantive dimension - their respective MPA regimes.  
In order to acquire a decent understanding of this interaction, it is required to analyze the 
institutional and normative regimes of these instruments (insofar relevant in relation to the 
purpose of this thesis, as provided above). This research is conducted in a way that can best be 
described as pragmatic doctrinal research - especially in the case of OSPAR. For the analysis 
of its MPA regime, point of departure are the Convention itself, as well as the entire spectrum 
of hard- and soft law documents that surround it. In the case of the ILBI, the approach is less 
pragmatic and could be placed more in the sphere of the principled doctrinal research.20 Given 
that negotiations are ongoing, the author is therefore required to resort to a wider variety of 
secondary sources as well as the underlying principles and objectives.  
1.4 Use of sources 
The “classic starting point”21 for identifying the sources of international law are listed in article 
38 of the Statutes of the International Court of Justice.22 The sources listed in this provision 
provide the principal methodological focus of this thesis. International conventions are a key 
source, and provide the foundation of this thesis. Most prominently the UNCLOS, as well as, 
inter alia, the OSPAR Convention and the CBD. Furthermore, a variety of soft-law instruments 
are used. These include United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolutions related to the 
BBNJ process, and a wide array of OSPAR recommendations and other documents surrounding 
its MPA network. As for secondary sources, a wide array of legal literature is reviewed and 
comprised during the research. Moreover, the various documents that are developed throughout 
the BBNJ-process are used extensively. These documents, which will become preparatory 
works once the ILBI is adopted, strictly speaking do not have any formal legal value but 
nonetheless bear political and normative weight, as they give important insights in what the 
ILBI will eventually look like. Lastly, reports of meetings from the OSPAR Commission and 
other bodies are thoroughly analyzed.  
 
20 Cane P and Conaghan J, ‘Doctrinal Legal Research” The New Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
21 Roberts A and Sivakumaran S, ‘The theory and reality of the sources of international law’ in Evans D M (eds) 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 5 edn, 2018) 89. 
22 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 1945) USTS 993. 
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1.5 Structure of this thesis 
This thesis is structured in the following manner: Chapter 2 outlines the existing legal 
framework in ABNJ, with emphasis on the establishment of MPAs. In chapter 3, the OSPAR 
MPA network in ABNJ is analyzed. Firstly, the OSPAR Convention and OSPAR’s competence 
to establish MPAs in ABNJ is reviewed, followed by an in-depth examination of OSPAR’s 
MPA network in ABNJ. This is done by looking at the different stages of the MPA process: 
identification and designation; implementation, monitoring and review; enforcement and 
compliance. In chapter 4, focus is shifted to the global level: the BBNJ negotiations. Firstly, the 
institutional arrangements and cooperation are examined. Thereafter, the MPA regime of the 
ILBI is analyzed, by looking at the above-mentioned stages of the MPA-process.  
The following two chapters combine these findings, and form the core of this thesis. The 
institutional dynamics and cooperation between OSPAR and the ILBI are discussed in chapter 
5, and chapter 6 compares their respective MPA regimes. Finally, in chapter 7 some general 
conclusions are drawn.  
CHAPTER 2: THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MPAS IN ABNJ 
2.1 Introduction 
As the term ‘areas beyond national jurisdiction’ (ABNJ) suggests, these waters are not subject 
to the legislative jurisdiction of any State. This however by no means implies that ABNJ is 
some type of legal void. In fact, there are more than 190 global or regional agreements 
applicable in ABNJ.23 For the purpose of this thesis, two global instruments are of importance: 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea24 and the Convention on Biological Biodiversity. 
This chapter will assess the existing legal framework in ABNJ, focusing on these two 
instruments. This analysis forms the basis for the discussions in the following chapters.  
The following section discusses UNCLOS (section 2) and its key characteristics, namely the 
zonal- and regional approach (section 3). Next, the CBD is assessed in section 4. Finally, some 
conclusions are drawn in section 5. 
2.2 The Law of the Sea Convention 
UNCLOS, often referred to as the ‘constitution of the oceans’ is a framework convention, and 
lays down the general rules and principles for ocean government. UNCLOS is a dynamic treaty, 
 
23 Bigagli E, “The International Legal Framework for the Management of the Global Oceans Social-Ecological 
System” (2016) 68 Marine Policy 157. 
24 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay (adopted 10 December 1982, in force 16 
November 1994) UNTS 397. 
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which lends itself well for evolutive interpretation, as it is both long-standing, and contains 
several ‘generic’ provisions and terms.25 One key element of the UNCLOS regime is the 
introduction of maritime zones. Coastal States generate a territorial sea and contiguous zone, 
an exclusive economic zone and a continental shelf.26 Beyond these maritime zones, in which 
the coastal State can exercise a certain degree of jurisdiction, the regimes of the Area and the 
high seas apply – as regulated in respective parts VII and XI of UNCLOS. These maritime 
zones, collectively referred to as ABNJ, ultimately reflect the overarching mare liberum, or 
‘freedom of the high seas’ principle. The overall result is “a complex, loosely coordinated, and 
generally permissive regime for governing ABNJ”.27  
The central provision of part VII on the high seas is article 87. It contains a non-exhaustive list 
of the high seas freedoms, including the freedoms of navigation, overflight and fishing. States 
must exercise these freedoms in a manner consistent with UNCLOS and other rules of 
international law, and with due regard for the interests of other States.28 Although part VII does 
not contain a specific provision on the protection of the marine environment, the general rules 
contained in part XII (which will be further discussed below) are thus applicable in the high 
seas, as well as rules of customary international law and those contained in other conventions 
(e.g., IMO instruments). Moreover, section II of Part VII effectively qualifies the freedom of 
fishing. This is made clear by articles 118 and 119 and also by additional instruments regulating 
high seas marine living resources, most prominently the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement.29 It can 
be concluded that, although characterized as “permissive”, high seas freedoms are subject to 
several restraints, and thus by no means absolute.  
The Area comprises of the deep seabed, ocean floor and subsoil.30 The Area contains a variety 
of mineral and hydrocarbon resources, which are the “common heritage of mankind”, a concept 
introduced by Pardo’s historic speech at the UNGA in 1967.31 These mineral resources, and 
the exploitation thereof, form the central tenet of part XI. This contrasts sharply with Part VI as 
discussed above, which revolves around the high seas freedoms. Some similarities can 
nonetheless be spotted, as no State can claim or exercise jurisdiction or sovereignty in the 
 
25 Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) [2009] ICJ Rep 109-10 para. 
66. 
26 Parts II, V and VI UNCLOS. Part IV on archipelagic States is also relevant in certain cases. 
27 Mendenhall et al, supra note 15, 1. 
28 Article 87 (1) UNCLOS. 
29 R Rothwell, T Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (3rd edn, Nordicum-Mediterraneum 2012) ch 7, 177. 
30 Article 1 (1) UNCLOS. 
31 A Pardo, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind: Selected Papers on Oceans and World Order: 1967-1974’ 
(Malta University Press, 1975), 31. 
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Area.32 The main components of the common heritage doctrine are: a mechanism of 
international management of deep seabed mining through the International Seabed Authority 
(ISA); the sharing of benefits from deep seabed mining for the benefit of humanity as a whole; 
the peaceful use of deep seabed areas; and the non-appropriation of seabed areas and seabed 
resources private entities or States.33  
In contrast to the regime of the EEZ, which has a maximum breadth of 200 nm, the continental 
shelf can extend beyond 200 nm if the criteria listed in article 77 (4) are met.34 In these 
situations, a ‘dual-regime’ exists, where the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil fall under the 
continental shelf regime (and are thus within national jurisdiction), and the water column is 
high seas (and thus beyond national jurisdiction). This has proven to be problematic when 
regional organizations want to establish MPAs in these areas. Permission and cooperation from 
the coastal State in question is required, and it has been shown that States are generally hesitant 
to do so.35 This led to the establishment of MPAs for only the water column, where the seabed 
remains unprotected.36  
Lastly, it is important to mention that States can, in principle, only exercise legislative and 
enforcement jurisdictions on vessels flying its flag.37 In a few limited scenarios, enforcement 
actions can be taken against ships flying a different flag, but only when strict conditions are 
met.38 As little to no relationship between a vessel and the flag State is required, stringent flag 
State jurisdiction can be easily evaded by registering under ‘flag of convenience’. This can  
easily be done, as some States have open registers. As of 2015, 71.3% of the global fleet was 
registered in open registries.39 
Part XII of UNCLOS contains rules regarding the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, and is applicable in all maritime zones – ABNJ. The central provision of this Part 
 
32 Article 137 (1) UNCLOS. 
33 R Rothwell, T Stephens, supra note 29, 126. 
34 A more detailed discussion of the complex issue of extended continental shelves falls beyond the scope of this 
thesis. For an in-depth discussion: Busch SV, ‘The Delimitation of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nm’ in 
Oude Elferink AG, Henriksen T and Busch SV (eds), Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Case Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2018) 319 – 375. 
35 This was shown by several OSPAR MPA’s, when coastal States were asked to establish seabed MPAs on their 
extended continental shelves. Iceland refused this, and Portugal committed itself to do but the actual 
establishment of these MPAs took over five years (OSPAR Commission Meeting 2015, summary record (OSPAR 
15/20/1-E) par. 4.26). 
36 For example, the Charlie-Gibbs North MPA under OSPAR is located on Iceland’s extended continental shelf, 
which remains unprotected (2018 MPA Status report, supra note 15, 18). 
37 Article 92 UNCLOS. 
38 Article 110, 111 UNCLOS. 
39 Ford JH and Wilcox C, “Shedding Light on the Dark Side of Maritime Trade – A New Approach for 
Identifying Countries as Flags of Convenience” (2019) 99 Marine Policy 1. 
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is article 192, which is customary international law.40 Article 192 contains a general obligation 
to protect the marine environment.  
Additionally, article 194 (1) is of particular importance in regard to marine protected areas - 
although this term is not used in UNCLOS. Paragraph 1 allows States to take “all measures” to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution. On top of that, paragraph 5 provides that “special 
measures” can be taken to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems. What such measures 
might entail is not further elaborated on. It can be argued that this provision allows for the 
establishment of MPAs in the EEZ.41 This provision does not, however, provide legal basis for 
the unliteral establishment of MPAs in ABNJ. This conclusion can be derived from the wording 
of paragraph 1, providing that measures taken based on this provision need to be “in accordance 
with part XII”. Part XII builds on the jurisdictional framework of specific maritime zones 
contained in UNCLOS,42 including the common heritage and high seas freedoms regimes. 
Establishing MPAs in ABNJ, and thereby imposing restrictions on other States cannot be said 
to be in accordance with these rules.  
Also of relevance is the obligation of States to cooperate for the protection and preservation of 
the marine environment, as reflected in article 197. States must take into account characteristic 
regional features, Importantly, it can be derived from the wording of this provision that global 
cooperation seems to be preferred.43 
2.3 Zonal and Sectoral Approach 
Key characteristics of UNCLOS are its zonal and sectoral approach. The zonal approach 
essentially entails the introduction of maritime zones, as discussed in the section 2. From an 
environmental point of view, this is arguably a flawed system. Ecosystems are not bound by 
jurisdictional boundaries, and often spread out across several of them. This makes it a complex 
task to effectively manage and protect ecosystems, as they may be subject to different regimes. 
It requires cooperation and coordination with many different stakeholders, States and 
organizations to effectively manage them. The sectoral approach further complicates the 
establishment of coherent MPAs. This approach encompasses the fact that different activities 
are governed by different bodies. Cooperating mechanisms between such bodies do not exist 
within UNCLOS. In ABNJ, this is particularly challenging. If States want to establish a 
 
40 South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v China) ICGJ 495 (PCA 2016) par. 956. 
41 Oude Elferink AG, “Coastal States and MPAs in ABNJ: Ensuring Consistency with the LOSC” (2018) 33 The 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 445. 
42 Molenaar EJ, Oude Elferink AG, “Marine Protected Areas in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction The 
Pioneering Efforts under the OSPAR Convention” (2009) 5 Utrecht Law Review 9. 
43 ‘States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis’, Article 194 (5) UNCLOS. 
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coherent MPA – governing all activities in a certain area, cooperation with a variety of bodies 
is necessary. Three of such bodies are of particular importance in relation to OSPAR: The 
International Seabed Authority (ISA), North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), 
and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Their competences shall now be further 
explained. 
The exploration of mineral resources on the deep seabed (the Area) is governed by the ISA. 
The ISA has an extensive mandate to protect the marine environment, granted by article 145 
UNCLOS. Moreover, by virtue of article 162(2)(x) UNCLOS the ISA can disapprove areas for 
exploitation by contractors in case of potential risk of serious harm to the marine environment. 
It is important to note that the ISA’s environmental mandate is strictly limited to matters related 
to non-living resources. Activities like bottom trawling, with detrimental effects on deep-sea 
ecosystems, fall outside of its mandate. In its Mining Code44 the ISA introduced several 
environmental safeguards and widely applies the precautionary approach.45 The ISA can 
designate Preservation Reference Zones (PRZ)46 in which mining is prohibited, and Areas of 
Particular Interest (APEIs),47 aimed at protecting certain habitat types.  
States fishing on the high seas are obliged to cooperate under article 118 UNCLOS. Where 
there is a Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMO) with competence to establish 
conservation and management measures, States are obliged to give effect to their duty to 
cooperate by becoming a member of this RFMO, or by agreeing to apply the conservation and 
management measures established by this RFMO.48 For OSPAR, the most important RFMO is 
NEAFC, given the vast overlap between their respective maritime areas.49 The primary purpose 
of RFMOs is the regulation and coordination of the exploitation of fish stocks. The conservation 
of living resources is also a key element in their mandate, as provided by article 118 UNCLOS. 
The FSA further elaborates on this obligation, and introduces modern principles like the 
 
44 The Mining Code comprises of three sets of regulations: Regulations on prospecting and exploration for 
polymetallic nodules in the Area, 13 July 2000 (Nodules Regulations); Regulations on prospecting and 
exploration for polymetallic sulphides in the Area, 7 may 2010 (Sulphides Regulations); Regulations on 
prospecting and exploration for cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts in the Area, 29 November 2009 (Cobalt Crusts 
Regulations). 
45 Scovazzi T, “The Exploitation of Resources of the Deep-Seabed and the Protection of the Environment” 
(2014) 57 Germain Yearbook Of International Law 185. 
46 Regulation 31 (7) Nodules Regulations. 
47 ISA Legal and Technical Commission, ‘Environmental Management Plan for the Clarion-Clipperton Zone’ 
(ISBA/17/LTC/7) 13 July 2011, Article 42. 
48 UN Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks (adopted 4 August 1995, in force 11 December 2001) 2167 UNTS 88, article 8 (3). 
49 Benn AR et al, “Human Activities on the Deep Seafloor in the North East Atlantic: An Assessment of Spatial 
Extent” (2010) 5 PLoS ONE. 
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ecosystem50 and precautionary approach.51 NEAFC actively uses this mandate to protect the 
marine environment, and has been fighting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing with a 
blacklist since 2005, and has a Port State Control system in place since 2007.52 Under its own 
Convention, NEAFC has the possibility to close certain areas from fisheries. 53 NEAFC has 
used this option extensively, by closing five areas in the Rockall-Hatton Bank area to bottom 
fishing in 2007, and by closing five areas to bottom fishing in the Mid-Atlantic Ridge in ABNJ 
to protect Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems (VMEs) in 2009.54 
The third sectoral body of importance is the IMO, the global organization responsible for 
regulation of international shipping activities.55 The IMO has 171 member States, and its main 
instruments have close to universal acceptance.56 As the primary global body for shipping, it 
plays an important standard-setting role through UNCLOS, which refers to “generally accepted 
international standards” (GAIRAS) in a significant number of provisions throughout the 
Convention.57 It is largely agreed that standards are “generally accepted” when they meet the 
criteria of widespread participation.58 Given the widespread acceptance of IMO instruments, 
standards set by the IMO can therefore become binding on UNCLOS parties through GAIRAS, 
even when they are not a member to the relevant treaty.  
Two key Conventions adopted under the IMO are MARPOL59 and SOLAS,60 which both have 
close to universal acceptance. IMO instruments rely heavily on the flag State principle as laid 
down in article 94 UNCLOS. The IMO Conventions are thus also applicable in ABNJ, given 
that States can exercise jurisdiction over their flagged vessels anywhere. Although it is not its 
primary focus, the IMO does have tools to protect the marine environment from shipping 
impacts by establishing Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs) and Special Areas under 
 
50 Article 5 (f) FSA 
51 Article 6 FSA 
52 Hoydal K, Johnson D and Hoel A, ‘Regional Governance: The Case of NEAFC and OSPAR’ in Serge M. 
Garcia Jake Rice Anthony Charles (eds), Governance of Marine Fisheries and Biodiversity Conservation (Wiley 
2014) 229 
53 Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in Northeast Atlantic Fisheries (18 November 1980, in force 
17 March 1982) 
54 Hoydal K, Johnson D, Hoel A, supra note 52, 230 
55 Gjerde KM and Rulska-Domino A, “Marine Protected Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: Some Practical 
Perspectives for Moving Ahead” (2012) 27 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 364. 
56 By percentage of global merchant tonnage: MARPOL, 97,07%; SOLAS, 98,8%; STCW 98.77%; COLREG, 
98,05% (IMO Document MSC 84/INF.13, 2008).  
57 E.g. UNCLOS Articles 21 (2) on innocent passage; Article 39 (2) (b) on transit passage; Article 94 (2) (a) on 
flag state duties; Article 211 (2) on pollution from vessels. 
58 Frank V, The European Community and marine environmental protection in the international law of the sea: 
implementing global obligations at the regional level (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) ch 1, 26 
59 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 17 February 1973, as modified by the 
Protocol of 1978, in force 2 October 1983. 
60 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1 November 1974, in force 25 May 1980. 
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MARPOL. A PSSA is an area that requires special protection because of its significance for 
recognized “ecological, socio-economic, or scientific attributes where such attributes may be 
vulnerable to damage by international shipping activities”.61 PSSAs are established through 
non-binding IMO Assembly resolutions, and in and of itself confer no direct regulatory 
benefit.62 They must therefore be accompanied by at least one ‘associated protective measure’ 
(APM), which must be submitted within two years after the approval in principle of the PSSA.63 
These measures “should be specifically tailored to meet the need of the area to prevent, reduce, 
or eliminate the identified vulnerability of the area from international shipping activities”,64 and 
may include may include ships’ routeing measures, reporting requirements, discharge 
restrictions, operational criteria and prohibited activities.65 APMs can also include the 
designation of a Special Area under MARPOL.66 A Special Area is defined as “a sea area where 
for recognized technical reasons in relation to its oceanographical and ecological conditions 
and to the particular character of its traffic, the adoption of special mandatory methods for the 
prevention of sea pollution by oil, noxious liquid substances, or garbage, as applicable, is 
required”.67 Special Areas are intended to grant a higher level of protection to specific 
vulnerable parts of the oceans,68 and impose more stringent restrictions on the discharge of 
harmful substances.69 A Special Area can encompass the maritime zones of several States, or 
even an entire enclosed or semi-enclosed area.70 Whereas no PSSAs have been designated in 
ABNJ, Special Areas were designated in high seas areas of the Mediterranean Sea and Antarctic 
Sea.71  
In sum, all these sectoral bodies have the tools to establish marine protected areas or other area 
based management tools. They all have different purposes and use different criteria to establish 
 
61 IMO Revised guidelines for the identification and designation of particularly sensitive sea areas, 1 December 
2005, Article 1.2. 
62 Prior S, Chircop A and Roberts J, “Area-Based Management on the High Seas: Possible Application of the 
IMO’s Particularly Sensitive Sea Area Concept” (2010) 25 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
499. 
63 Drankier P, “Marine Protected Areas in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction” (2012) 27 The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 301. 
64 IMO Resolution A.982(24), 6 February 2006 (A 24/Res.982) par. 7.5.2. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 6.1.1. Special Areas can be designated under MARPOL Annexes I, II, IV and V. 
67 IMO Resolution A.927(22), 15 January 2002, par. 2.1. 
68 Drankier P, supra note 63, 300. 
69 Prior S, Chircop A and Roberts J, “Area-Based Management on the High Seas: Possible Application of the 
IMO’s Particularly Sensitive Sea Area Concept” (2010) 25 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
509. 
70 IMO Resolution Resolution A.927(22), 15 January 2002 par. 2.2. 
71 Special Areas under MARPOL, 




them. In order to establish a coherent MPA in ABNJ, cooperation with these bodies is required 
so that these protective measures can be coordinated and all activities in the area are covered.   
2.4 Convention on Biological Diversity 
Besides the UNCLOS, the other global instrument with relevance to MPAs in ABNJ is the 
CBD. The CBD is more of a modern treaty, at least in comparison to UNCLOS, and applies the 
precautionary and ecosystem approach.72 At first glance, this Convention appears to be a 
suitable instrument for the establishment of such MPAs. In this regard, article 4 and 8 are of 
particular importance. The former delineates the scope of the CBD and provides that it is 
applicable to components of biodiversity in areas within national jurisdiction, and merely to 
processes and activities in ABNJ. The latter provision entails the obligation to establish a 
system of MPAs or areas where special measures need to be taken to conserve biological 
diversity. Drankier argues that article 8 is also applicable in ABNJ, considering that such 
special measures would be used to regulate processes or activities.73 Others argue that the 
establishment of MPAs in ABNJ would concern the protection of components of biodiversity, 
and thus fall outside of the CBD’s scope.74 The latter argument seems the most convincing, 
given that article 22 (2) of the CBD gives priority to the law of the sea. Rather than overcoming 
the restrictions of the UNCLOS as discussed above, the CBD thereby confirms this 
framework.75 Moreover, article 5 urges parties to cooperate with each other and with competent 
international organizations in respect of ABNJ for the conservation and sustainable 
development of biodiversity. It should be noted that by the inclusion of the phrase “as far as 
possible and as appropriate”, the binding force of this provision is limited. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the CBD’s relevance in regard to MPA governance in ABNJ 
is very limited. It has been observed that this instrument largely relies on “the goodwill of its 
Parties and other competent organizations to implement its decisions, targets and guidance 
documents”.76 Therefore, this brief analysis will suffice for the purpose of this thesis. 
 
72 The precautionary approach is implicitly mentioned in the preamble of the Convention, and an ecosystem 
approach can be derived from articles 2, 8 and 9. See also Decision COP II/8 (UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/2/8) 
where it is provided that the  “ecosystem approach should be the primary framework of action to be taken under 
the Convention”. 
73 Drankier P, supra note 63, 297. 
74 Matz-Lück N, Fuchs J, “The Impact of OSPAR on Protected Area Management beyond National Jurisdiction: 
Effective Regional Cooperation or a Network of Paper Parks?” (2014) 49 Marine Policy 158. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ardron JA et al, “The Sustainable Use and Conservation of Biodiversity in ABNJ: What Can Be Achieved 
Using Existing International Agreements?” (2014) 49 Marine Policy 100. 
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2.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has given a general overview of the existing legal framework in ABNJ. The 
comment that the regime governing ABNJ is “complex, loosely coordinated, and generally 
permissive”77 is accurate. It is no novelty that there is a need to improve this regime, especially 
in regard to biodiversity protection. This has led to the initiation of the BBNJ process, which 
will be further discussed in the chapter 4. For now, if a regional organization wishes to establish 
an MPA in ABNJ, it has to find its way through this complex framework. Looking at UNCLOS, 
it can be concluded that it remains silent on the unilateral or regional establishment of MPAs in 
ABNJ. It neither allows nor prohibits it. Establishment of MPAs in ABNJ by means of regional 
cooperation is possible, as long as it is in accordance with the Convention and other rules of 
(customary) international law. The compatibility between high seas freedoms of third States 
and conservation measures in the MPAs need careful consideration.78 Cooperation with many 
different States, stakeholders, sectoral and regional organizations is required in order to 
establish an MPA in ABNJ. It should also be borne in mind that, even when such cooperation 
is successful, conservation measures in such an MPA can only be imposed on the parties that 
agreed to its establishment, in accordance with the pacta tertiis principle. 
CHAPTER 3: MPAS IN ABNJ UNDER OSPAR 
3.1 Introduction 
It has previously been shown that MPA coverage in OSPAR’s ABNJ-maritime area is very 
high, with 8,9% coverage. This stands in stark contrast with the global average in ABNJ of 
1,2%. These numbers certainly give the impression that biodiversity protection in this area is at 
a very high level. However, the literature is full of examples of ‘paper parks’, i.e. designated 
protected areas that are not ensuring a high level of protection in practice.79 This chapter will 
assess OSPAR’s network of MPAs in ABNJ, in order to establish whether it can be qualified 
as such. 
Firstly, OSPAR’s regulatory framework, as well as its competence to establish MPAs in ABNJ 
will be discussed in section 2. Thereafter, the MPA regime will be thoroughly reviewed by 
looking at the following stages: Identification and designation (section 3), cooperation with 
 
77 Mendenhall E et al, supra note 15.  
78 Tanaka Y, “Reflections on High Seas Marine Protected Areas: A Comparative Analysis of the Mediterranean 
and the North-East Atlantic Models” (2012) 81 Nordic Journal of International Law 325. 
79 Pieraccini M, Coppa S and Lucia GAD, “Beyond Marine Paper Parks? Regulation Theory to Assess and 




other organizations (section 4), implementation and monitoring (section 5) and enforcement 
(section 6).  
3.2 OSPAR Convention and competence to establish MPAs in ABNJ 
The OSPAR Convention was adopted in Paris on 22 September 1992, and replaced the 1972 
Oslo Convention on Dumping Waste at Sea and the 1974 Paris Convention on Land-Based 
Sources and Marine Pollution. OSPAR has 16 contracting parties (CPs): Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the 
European Union, all of which have signed and ratified the OSPAR Convention.  
OSPAR is a modern, second generation environmental protection treaty.80 This is illustrated by 
the inclusion of the precautionary principle,81 polluter pays principle,82 ecosystem approach83 
and the use of best Best Available Techniques (BAT) and Best Environmental Practices 
(BEP).84 The Convention consists of 34 articles, containing general obligations and principles 
which are elaborated in its five Annexes and three Appendixes.85 Article 1 (a) defines the 
‘maritime area’, in which the Convention applies. The maritime area encompasses extensive 
areas of ABNJ in the Wider Atlantic and the Arctic, covering roughly 40% of the total area.86  
OSPAR’s key organ is the OSPAR Commission. The Commission meets annually, and is made 
up of representatives of each of the CPs.  Its most important functions include supervising the 
implementation of the Convention and reviewing the condition of the maritime area and the 
effectiveness of measures.87 The Commission can adopt decisions and recommendations.88 
Both are adopted by consensus, or a three-quarters majority when no consensus can be 
reached.89 Decisions are legally binding,90 whereas recommendations have no binding force.91 
Besides CPs, the Commission meetings can also be attended by Observers.92 Observers have 
 
80 König D, “Marine Environment, International Protection” (2013) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law 15. 
81 OSPAR Convention preamble; Article 2 (2)(a); Article 3 (1)(b). 
82 OSPAR Convention preamble; Article 2 (1)(a); Article 2 (2)(a). 
83 OSPAR Convention Article 2 (2)(b). 
84 OSPAR Convention Article 2 (3)(b). 
85 Molenaar EJ, Oude Elferink AG, supra note 42, 13. 
86 MPAs in areas beyond national jurisdiction, https://www.ospar.org/work-areas/bdc/marine-protected-
areas/mpas-in-areas-beyond-national-jurisdiction, accessed on 5 June 2020. 
87 OSPAR Convention Article 10. 
88 OSPAR Convention Article 13 (1). 
89 OSPAR Convention Article 13 (2). 
90 OSPAR Convention Article 13 (2). 
91 OSPAR Convention Article 13 (5). 
92 OSPAR Convention article 11. 
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no voting right, but may participate and present information and reports.93 OSPAR currently 
has 64 Observers: 41 NGOs and 23 Intergovernmental Organizations.94   
Annex V of the OSPAR Convention on “The Protection And Conservation Of The Ecosystems 
And Biological Diversity Of The Maritime Area”, which was added in 1998, has most relevance 
in relation to MPAs. Article 2 of Annex V provides that: 
“In fulfilling their obligation under the Convention to take, individually and jointly, the necessary 
measures to protect the maritime area against the adverse effects of human activities […]”95 
This provision provides general obligations with regard to the protection of the maritime area.96 
Building on this obligation, Article 3 (1)(b)(ii) formulates a duty of the OSPAR Commission 
to: 
“develop means, consistent with international law, for instituting protective, conservation, 
restorative or precautionary measures related to specific areas or sites or related to particular 
species or habitats;”97 
Neither of these provisions provide directly for the establishment of MPAs in ABNJ. These 
provisions are, however, mentioned in the preamble of the decisions creating MPAs in ABNJ, 
and thus seem to be interpreted as the legal basis for their establishment.  
Article 4 of Annex V is also of importance, as it limits the scope of the OSPAR Convention by 
excluding measures related to fisheries and maritime transport. Although not expressly stated, 
deep sea mining activities are also excluded from OSPAR’s mandate, as these are governed by 
the ISA. All other activities which can have an adverse effect on the ecosystem and the 
biological diversity in the North-East Atlantic are covered by OSPAR.98 Such activities include 
scientific research, cable-laying, land-based pollution, and the construction of offshore 
installations and artificial islands.  
OSPAR’s CPs committed themselves in 200399 to establish an ecologically-coherent and well 
managed network of MPAs.100 The aim of this ‘OSPAR network’ is threefold: 
 
93 OSPAR Convention article 11 (2). 
94 https://www.ospar.org/organisation/observers, accessed 9 August 2020. 
95 OSPAR Convention Annex V, Article 2. 
96 Tanaka Y, supra note 78, 315. 
97 OSPAR Convention Annex V, Article 3 (1)(b)(ii). 
98 Molenaar EJ, Oude Elferink AG, supra note 42, 14. 
99 Summary record 2003 OSPAR Commission meeting (OSPAR 03/17/1-E) 23-27 June 2003, Annex 9: OSPAR 
Recommendation 2003/3 on a Network of Marine Protected Areas. 
100 OSPAR Recommendation 2003/3, par. 2.1. 
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1. Protect, conserve and restore species, habitats and ecological processes which are adversely 
affected as a result of human activities;  
2. Prevent degradation of and damage to species, habitats and ecological processes, following the 
precautionary principle;  
3. Protect and conserve areas that best represent the range of species, habitats and ecological 
processes in the OSPAR maritime area.101 
 
This MPA network includes MPAs “outside the jurisdiction of the CPs which has been included 
as a component of the network by the OSPAR Commission”.102 The legal framework within 
which this is to be achieved, is addressed in a document that was published in 2009, named 
“OSPAR’s Regulatory Regime for establishing Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in Areas 
Beyond National Jurisdiction (ABNJ) of the OSPAR Maritime Area”.103 In this document, it is 
concluded that OSPAR plays an important role in protecting the parts of its maritime area in 
ABNJ. It is argued that no other international organization is mandated to set in place an 
integrated process for the protection of this area, having regard to human activities and their 
cumulative impacts on the basis of the ecosystem approach.104 It is acknowledged that 
OSPAR’s competences in ABNJ are limited, but this is then relativized by the argument that: 
“the limitations to manage such important activities also apply in areas within national jurisdiction 
(cf. UNCLOS Article 58), and this had not been an impediment for establishing MPAs in such areas. 
Thus it may be said that ABNJ raise additional questions, but not necessarily new issues with respect 
to the scope of OSPAR to exercise its competence in ABNJ.”105 
However, as pointed out by Matz-Lück and Fuchs, this “can hardly be considered an 
argument”106 since the context is entirely different. Indeed, the drafters of this document seem 
to overlook fact that in the EEZ the coastal State has jurisdiction with regard to the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment.107 Although it is correct that the EEZ, for certain 
purposes, remains “high seas” since thirds States enjoy certain high seas freedoms,108 it should 
not be overlooked that States exercising these rights must have due regard to the rights and 
duties of the coastal State109 - whose domestic regulations adopted pursuant to article 56 (1) 
UNCLOS form an integral part of the EEZ regime. In the high seas, in contrast, equal rights are 
 
101 Ibid., par. 2.1. 
102 Ibid., par. 1.1. 
103 2009 OSPAR Commission meeting (OSPAR 09/22/1-E) 22–26 June 2009, Annex 6. 
104 Ibid., par. 2.21. 
105 Ibid., 2.22. 
106 Matz-Lück N, Fuchs J, supra note 74, 159. 
107 Article 56 (1)(b)(iii) UNCLOS. 
108 Article 58 (1), 87 (1) UNCLOS. 
109 Article 58 (3) UNCLOS. 
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granted to all States. Although a rule of ‘due regard’ also applies here, all States are placed on 
an equal footing – which is an important difference.  
Although this argumentation is compelling, in the author’s view there is more nuance to it. 
What should be kept in mind, is the question of the range of application of these MPAs. For 
these measures to merely apply inter partes, the OSPAR Convention provides sufficient legal 
basis. This is in line with article 311 (3) UNCLOS, as the establishment of MPAs that apply 
inter partes is in line with the objectives of UNCLOS, especially those of part XII. However, 
when a broader range of application is pursued (i.e., non-OSPAR member States) more legal 
hurdles present themselves. Here, the above argument regarding the differences between ABNJ 
and the EEZ weights more heavily. The rights and freedoms of all States (in particularly non-
OSPAR CPs) need to be carefully considered, and intensive cooperation with sectoral bodies is 
required.  
OSPAR has been actively expanding its MPA network since 2003. The so called ‘OSPAR 
Network’ comprises of a total of 496 MPAs, covering an area of 864,337 square kilometers, 
and 6.4 % of the OSPAR Maritime Area.110 Seven of those MPAs are located in ABNJ, as 
shown in table 3.1 below. 




110 OSPAR 2018 MPA Status report, supra note 17, 7. 
111 Ibid., 17. 
Name   Established Size Located entirely in ABNJ 
Charlie-Gibbs South MPA   OSPAR Ministerial Meeting in 2010 146,032 km² Yes 
Mid-Atlantic Ridge North 
of the Azores High Seas 
MPA 
  OSPAR Ministerial Meeting in 2010 93,570 km² No, seabed located on 
extended continental shelf of 
Portugal 
Milne Seamount Complex 
MPA 
  OSPAR Ministerial Meeting in 2010 20,914 km² Yes 
Josephine Seamount High 
Seas MPA 
  OSPAR Ministerial Meeting in 2010 19,363 km² No, seabed located on 
extended continental shelf of 
Portugal 
Altair Seamount High Seas 
MPA 
  OSPAR Ministerial Meeting in 2010 4,384 km² No, seabed located on 
extended continental shelf of 
Portugal 
Antialtair High Seas MPA   OSPAR Ministerial Meeting in 2010 2,807 km² No, seabed located on 
extended continental shelf of 
Portugal 
Charlie-Gibbs North High 
Seas MPA 
  OSPAR Ministerial Meeting in 2012 178,094 km² No, seabed located on 




These MPAs will now be thoroughly analyzed and discussed. The focus will be on the Charlie-
Gibbs South MPA. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, because it is entirely located in ABNJ. 
This is also the case for the Milne Seamount MPA, however this MPA is considerably smaller 
in size. Secondly, the process leading to the establishment of the Charlie Gibbs-South MPA is 
extensively documented and can be seen as the laying down the framework for the high seas 
MPAs that followed.  
3.3 Identification and designation 
In 2003, the OSPAR Commission adopted the “Guidelines for the Identification and Selection 
of Marine Protected Areas in the OSPAR Maritime Area”.112 This document, which was 
amended by the Biodiversity Committee113 in 2007 and 2016, sets out the process of 
identification and selection of sites. The procedure is applicable to the establishment of MPAs 
both within and beyond national jurisdiction.114 It sets out a two-stage approach to designating 
MPAs. In the first stage, the ‘ecological criteria/considerations’ should be applied, which are 
listed in Appendix 1. These are: Threatened or declining species and habitats/biotopes; 
important species and habitats/biotopes; ecological significance; high natural biological 
diversity; representativity; sensitivity; naturalness. An area qualifies for selection as an MPA if 
it meets several but not necessarily all of these criteria.115 It is not provided what is meant by 
“several”. It certainly means not all criteria need to be met, but at least more than one. O’Leary 
et al observed that “in practice it turned out that it was better to provide evidence that a site 
could meet many of the criteria”.116 Once sites are selected by using these criteria, they are to 
be prioritized by re-applying the criteria listed in Appendix 1, and by applying the additional 
‘practical criteria/considerations’ listed in Appendix 2: Size; potential for restoration; degree of 
acceptance; potential for success of management measures; potential damage to the areas by 
human activities; scientific value. As is illustrated by table 2.1, these criteria are well-balanced 
with the aims of the OSPAR Network.   
 
112 Agreement 2003-17, Guidelines for the Identification and Selection of Marine Protected Areas in the OSPAR 
Maritime Area, as amended by BDC 2007 (BDC 2007 Summary Record (BDC 07/12/1) § 3.43b), and BDC 
2016 (BDC 16/9/1, §5,27 and Annex 13). 
113 The Biodiversity Committee meets annually, and oversees the implementation of Annex V to the Convention, 
as well as the Biodiversity Strategy. 
114 OSPAR Agreement 2003-17 par. 3.2. 
115 Ibid., Appendix I. 
116 O'Leary B et al, “The First Network of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in the High Seas: The Process, the 
Challenges and Where Next” (2012) 36 Marine Policy 601. 
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Aims of the OSPAR Network  
 
Protect, conserve and restore 
species, habitats and 
ecological processes which are 
adversely affected as a result 
of human activities  
Prevent degradation of and 
damage to species, habitats 
and ecological processes 
following the precautionary 
principle  
Protect and conserve areas 
which best represent the range 
of species, habitats and 
ecological processes in the 
maritime area  
Ecological considerations  
 
(1.1) Threatened or declining 
species and habitats/biotopes 
(1.1) Threatened or declining 
species and habitats/biotopes 
(1.2) Important species and 
habitats/biotopes 
(1.6) Sensitivity  
(1.3) Ecological significance 
(1.4) High natural biological 
diversity 
(1.5) Representativity  
(1.7) Naturalness 
Practical considerations  
 
(2.1) Size  
(2.2) Potential for restoration  
(2.3) Degree of acceptance  
(2.4) Potential for success of 
management measures  
(2.6) Scientific value  
(2.1) Size  
(2.3) Degree of acceptance  
(2.4) Potential for success of 
management measures  
(2.6) Scientific value  
(2.5) Potential damage to the 
area by human activities  
(2.1) Size  
(2.3) Degree of acceptance  
(2.4) Potential for success of 
management measures  
(2.6) Scientific value  
Table 3.2: Correlation between identification criteria and aims of the OSPAR Network117 
Although it is provided that the Identification Guidelines are applicable to all MPAs, the 
document seems to be drafted for MPAs within national jurisdiction. Very specific information 
about the possible sites is required, which in many cases will not be available for the generally 
more remote sites in ABNJ. Moreover, Appendix 4 is not applicable to sites in ABNJ.118 This 
Appendix describes in a detailed proposal procedure for sites that are selected through this 
process. As an alternative, it is merely provided that the OSPAR Commission is responsible for 
data validation and final approval.119 
One interesting element in OSPAR’s designation process is the role of NGOs. As shown in 
section 2, a total of 41 NGOs are admitted to OSPAR as Observers. Whereas some of these 
NGOs play a very marginal role of importance, and rarely attend Commission meetings, others 
are very actively involved. Some NGOs, like BirdLife, OCEANA, WWF and GreenPeace are 
active participants in the Commission meetings, as well as OSPAR’s subsidiary bodies, such 
as the Intersessional Correspondence Group on Marine Protected Areas (ICG-MPA) and the 
Biodiversity Committee (BC). The formal basis for their involvement in these meetings cannot 
be found in the OSPAR Convention, which merely provides that Observers are allowed to 
attend Commission meetings, nor in the Identification Guidelines – that do not even mention 
Observers. It can instead be found in Annex 31 of the 2003 Commission meeting, outlining the 
“strategies of the OSPAR Commission for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-East Atlantic”.120  Here, it is provided that the OSPAR Commission shall consider reports 
 
117 OSPAR Agreement 2003-17, Appendix 3. 
118 OSPAR Agreement 2003-17, Appendix 4, 6, last paragraph. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Summary record 2003 OSPAR Commission meeting (OSPAR 03/17/1-(A-B)-E) 23-27 June 2003, Annex 31.  
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and assessments from CPs and observers on possible components of the OSPAR network.121 
Perhaps surprisingly, given this loose basis, some NGOs play an key role in the identification 
and designation of MPAs – as will become evident in the remainder of this section.  
The first proposal for an MPA in ABNJ, the Charlie-Gibbs Fracture Zone,122 was proposed by 
an NGO (WWF) in 2007.123 The five proposals that followed were prepared by the University 
of York, in collaboration with OSPAR and sponsored by Germany in 2008.124 Thereafter, only 
two new proposals for MPAs in ABNJ were made, both by NGOs: the Arctic Ice MPA and the 
North Atlantic Current and Evlanov Seamount (NACES) MPA, by respectively WWF125 and 
BirdLife.126 Notably, to date no CP has made a proposal for an MPA in ABNJ following the 
procedure in the Identification Guidelines. Given the limited guidance Agreement 2003-17 
gives for the selection of sites in ABNJ and taking into account the unique nature of these 
MPAs, a single mechanism to cover both types of MPAs seems sub-optimal. This was 
recognized by the parties in at the 2011 ICG-MPA meeting.127 It was noted that there is “no 
coordinated approach by CPs to select any further sites with a view to enhance the ecological 
coherence of the OSPAR MPA Network in ABNJ”.128 Regrettably, no follow-up was made in 
the following sessions.  
In 2019, a consultation procedure129 for MPAs in ABNJ was developed. The aim of this 
procedure is to enhance transparency of the nomination process, and to draw attention of users, 
coastal States and other stakeholders to the proposed MPA.130 This can certainly contribute to 
enhanced acceptance and compliance, but does not address the problem that there is no 
streamlined process for identifying sites in ABNJ. This is likely to be the reason that the last 
proposal made by a CP is dated from 2008. Although establishing MPAs in ABNJ is inherently 
more challenging than establishing MPAs within national jurisdiction due to the limited 
 
121 Ibid., par. 4.4 (d). 
122 Later to be split up in two MPAs, the Charlie-Gibbs North and -South MPAs. 
123 Summary record 2007 OSPAR Commission meeting (OSPAR 07/24/1-E) 25-19 June 2007, par. 6.17. 
124 Summary record 2008 OSPAR Meeting of the Working Group on Marine Protected Areas, Species and 
Habitats (MASH) Baiona (Spain): 21-24 October 2008, MASH 08/8/1-E, par. 5.17. 
125 Summary Record of the Meeting of the 2014 Biodiversity Committee (BDC), The Hague, 18-22 February 
2014, BDC 14/9/91, par. 4.18. 
126 Summary record 2011 OSPAR Intersessional Correspondence Group on Marine Protected Areas (ICG-MPA 
11/10/1-E) 5-7 September 2011. 
127 Summary record 2016 OSPAR Intersessional Correspondence Group on Marine Protected Areas (IGC-MPA 
16/9/1-E) 11-13 October 2016, par. 5.4. 
128 ICG-MPA 2011, supra note 116, par. 4.16. 
129 OSPAR Agreement 2019-09, General consultation procedures for establishing Marine Protected Areas in 
Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction of the OSPAR Maritime Area. 
130 Ibid., par. 3.1. 
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knowledge of these offshore areas, it can nonetheless be concluded that the existing 
mechanisms within OSPAR for selecting sites are lacking.  
3.4 Implementation, Monitoring and Review 
In order to assure that MPAs in ABNJ are not just “paper parks”,131 and actually achieve their 
conservation objectives, implementation of measures and monitoring their effects on the marine 
environment are essential. First, the measures that need to be implemented need to be reviewed.  
OSPAR’s MPAs in ABNJ are each established by a binding decision of the OSPAR 
Commission, which is accompanied by a non-binding recommendation. These documents are 
very similar for each MPA, thus one may take the Charlie Gibbs-South MPA as a sufficiently 
illustrative example. This MPA is established by Decision 2012/2.132 This document, which is 
fairly brief, sets out the purpose and scope, coordinates of the area and entry into force. The 
purpose of this decision is “to establish the Charlie-Gibbs South Marine Protected Area […] in 
accordance with the conservation objectives”. These objectives are set out in Annex 2 of the 
corresponding Recommendation.133 General objectives are given, as well as specific objectives 
for the water column, benthopelagic layer and benthos. The recommendation further contains 
provisions on awareness raising, information building, marine science, new developments, third 
parties and reporting obligations.134 It is important to note that the recommendation, which is 
of soft law nature,135 contains the substantive part of the MPA. Besides that, the objectives and 
other obligations are all very general and do not entail any specific obligations or actions. It is 
up to the CPs to implement this into their domestic legislation. On top of that, these objectives 
are phrased in a very hortatory manner.136 
On implementation of decisions, the OSPAR Convention provides that decisions shall, where 
appropriate, contain provisions specifying the timetable by which they shall be implemented.137 
Remarkably, the decisions that establish MPAs in ABNJ do not contain such provisions. The 
only mechanism in place to urge CPs to implement the MPAs is their obligation to report on 
implementation, anchored in article 5 of the Recommendation. This article provides that CPs 
should report annually on the implementation of the management measures. Annex 1 contains 
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a form, in which Parties are requested to provide information on specific measures, the 
effectiveness of measures, any specific difficulties encountered and the reasons for not having 
fully implemented the Recommendation.138 These reports are submitted to the ICG-MPA. The 
amount of reports that are received are generally very low, ranging from only 5 in 2013139 to 
11 in 2015.140 During the 2018 ICG-MPA meeting it was agreed to change the reporting format 
to a single form covering all MPAs, instead of a separate one for each individual MPA. The 
results are not made publicly available, and can thus not be assessed. Very little information in 
this regard is published by OSPAR, which raises questions regarding the implementation of 
measures. In the 2016 MPA status report,141 implementation of MPAs in ABNJ is briefly 
addressed. The question “Are measures to achieve conservation objectives being 
implemented?” is answered by merely stating that progress has been made in regard to the 
OSPAR-NEAFC collective arrangement and that “further work is required; in particularly with 
regard to seabed mining, cable laying and military activities”.142 The 2018 MPA Status report143 
merely states that no new information on the management status of MPAs in ABNJ has been 
provided since the 2016 data call.144  
Monitoring has been described as a key strength of the OSPAR Commission.145 The reporting 
obligation of the CPs is anchored in the OSPAR Convention in article 22. Building upon this, 
OSPAR has an extensive and detailed program in place to monitor and assess the status of the 
OSPAR maritime area.146 However, no monitoring programs are in place specifically for the 
MPAs in ABNJ. The recommendations provide that CPs should “identify suitable mechanisms 
for monitoring the achievement of the conservation objectives for the area”.147 However, as can 
be derived from the 2016 and 2018 MPA Status reports, progress in this regard is non-existent. 
In the 2016 Report it is stated that, given the lack of dedicated site condition monitoring 
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programs in place, it is unknown if the MPAs in ABNJ are moving towards its conservation 
objectives.148 No progress in this regard is shown by the 2018 Report. 
3.5 Enforcement and Compliance 
When discussing enforcement in ABNJ, two matters need to be emphasized. Frist of all, as 
noted in chapter two, conservation measures in ABNJ only work inter partes. In accordance 
with the pacta tertiis principle, conservation measures in the MPAs cannot be imposed on non-
CPs. Secondly, no State has enforcement powers on foreign-flagged vessels, except in a few 
limited scenarios which are subject to strict conditions, none of which relate to the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment.149 These two matters impose major limitations on 
any high seas MPA. 
Perhaps for this reason, the legal framework surrounding OSPAR’s MPAs lacks enforcement 
measures of any kind. The 2003 MPA Management Guidelines150 encourage CPs to adopt 
enforcement tools such as warnings, penalties and fines, however only with regard to MPAs 
within national jurisdiction. In the decisions and recommendations surrounding the MPAs in 
ABNJ, enforcement is not mentioned. OSPAR seems to be very aware of its limited competence 
in this regard, as the matter is not discussed during any of its Commission-, ICG-MPA or BDC 
meetings – as far as can be derived from the published documentation, at least. Flag State 
enforcement thus seems to be the only available tool. However, mere reliance on flag State 
enforcement is generally not very effective. As discussed in chapter 2, flag State controls can 
easily be circumvented by registering under a different Flag, preferably one of a State (e.g. a 
flag of convenience) that is no party to OSPAR.  
An issue closely related to enforcement is compliance. Given the absence of an enforcement 
scheme in OSPAR and the soft-law nature of the MPAs in ABNJ, it can be argued that a solid 
compliance mechanism is required, as in the absence of such a mechanism the implementation 
solely relies on the goodwill of the parties. In the OSPAR Convention, compliance is regulated 
in article 23. This provision provides that compliance shall be assessed by the Commission, 
based on the reports of the Parties on implementation. When appropriate, the Commission can 
take measures to assist a CP to carry out its obligations.151 As previously shown, reporting 
obligations with regard to MPAs in ABNJ are taken loosely by the Parties, and the results are 
 
148 2016 MPA Status report, supra note 141, par. 3.7, 46. 
149 Articles 110, 111 UNCLOS. 
150 OSPAR Commission, ‘Guidelines For The Management Of Marine Protected Areas In The OSPAR maritime 
Area’ (OSPAR 2003-18) par. 4.4. 
151 OSPAR Convention article 23 (b). 
24 
 
not made publicly available. As far as can be derived from the annual Commission reports, no 
measures based on this provision have so far been taken.  
3.6 International Cooperation 
As discussed in chapter 2, there are several sectoral organizations that are mandated to regulate 
activities in ABNJ. Cooperation with such bodies is thus necessary in order to establish a 
comprehensive cross-sectoral MPA in ABNJ. OSPAR has been doing so actively, and has taken 
the lead in enhancing cooperation in the North-East Atlantic by initiating the ‘Madeira Process’ 
– a series of informal meetings with the aim to ensure a high level of conservation of selected 
areas in the North-East Atlantic beyond national jurisdiction.152 The first meeting was held in 
2010, and attended by a variety of international organizations, including the ISA, NEAFC, 
IMO, ICCAT, NASCO, NAMMCO and IWC.153 A draft ‘Collective Arrangement’ (CA) was 
adopted, setting out the joint principles and specification for collaborative management of 
selected aspects of biodiversity protection.154 The OSPAR Commission endorsed the text in 
2011.155 In 2014, NEAFC entered the Arrangement, which led to the adoption of a renewed and 
more extensive Arrangement in 2014.156 The aim of this revised CA is to become “a collective 
and multilateral forum composed of all competent entities addressing the management of 
human activities in this region”.157 Thus, it differs significantly from the bilateral Memoranda 
of Understanding (MoU) as it aims at wider participation.158 The aim of the CA is to cooperate 
and seek coordination to ensure that suitable measures for the conservation and management of 
certain areas are implemented, informed by the conservation objectives established for these 
areas.159 The CA applies to selected areas beyond national jurisdiction in the North-East 
Atlantic. A list of all areas which are closed by NEAFC for the protection of Vulnerable Marine 
Ecosystems (VMEs) is included, as well of a list of all OSPAR MPAs in ABNJ. All areas are 
specified with coordinates and conservation measures that are applicable. The first meeting 
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under the CA was held in 2015, which was described as very successful by the OSPAR parties, 
leading to  “much better mutual understanding of working methods, approaches to conservation 
and potential for better collaboration and complementary actions”.160 The meeting has been 
held annually since then, steadily gaining attraction from a growing number of international 
organizations. At the most recent meeting in 2019, representatives from FAO, HELCOM, 
ICCAT, ICES, NAMMCO and UNEP attended.161 Despite efforts by NEAFC and OSPAR, to 
date the IMO and ISA have not entered the CA. Remarkably, after the third CA meeting in 
2017, NEAFC and OSPAR secretariats would contact the IMO and ISA for participating in the 
fourth meeting,162 but despite this they did not attend.163  
Besides continuing efforts to strengthen the Collective Arrangement, OSPAR has sought to 
formalize working arrangements with other international organizations by entering into 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoU). Throughout the years, a significant number of MoUs 
have been established. The most important ones in regard to MPAs in ABNJ shall now be 
briefly discussed.164 
The first document of importance in this regard is the cooperation arrangement with the IMO, 
which was established 1999.165 In this arrangement, the parties agree to consult each other on 
matters of common interest with a view of ensuring maximum coordination,166 exchange 
information167 and attend each other’s meetings.168 In 2018 the cooperation between the IMO 
and OSPAR was further strengthened by the adoption of a MoU169 with the purpose to 
“cooperate in promoting issues within the scope of the London Convention and London 
Protocol (LC/LP) to prevent marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter in order 
to protect the marine environment and promote the sustainable use of conservation of marine 
resources”.170 With a view to achieve this purpose, the IMO and OSPAR will promote reporting 
and compliance under the LC/LP, exchange information, promote the development and 
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implementation of joint regional workshops and capacity building, share experiences and 
implement technical cooperation and assistance activities.171 
Cooperation between NEAFC and OSPAR goes back to 2008, when a MoU172 was established. 
This MoU aims to enhance cooperation by, inter alia, exchanging information, cooperating in 
marine spatial planning and area management, encouraging the funding and conduct of marine 
science, cooperating on specific projects through ICES and establishing Observer 
arrangements.173  
Cooperation with the ISA was formalized through a MoU in 2011. The parties agreed to consult 
on matters of mutual interest with a view to enhance coordination of their respective activities, 
encourage the conduct of marine scientific research, exchange data and invite each other’s 
representatives to attend and participate in meetings of their governing bodies.  
Although MoUs can be a useful tool to enhance coordination, they are of a very general nature 
and do not specify the cooperation processes between the parties. The collective arrangement 
is more useful, since it not only contains more detailed obligations, but also a list of specific 
sites in which it is applicable. Coordination between OSPAR and NEAFC can still be improved, 
by further increasing the overlap of protected areas. In the meantime, however, by means of the 
CA the remaining sites are mutually recognized and a steady flow of information between both 
organizations is guaranteed. The annual meetings that have taken place under the CA have been 
marked very useful, and the number of participants is growing. Efforts by the OSPAR 
Commission to get the IMO and ISA should be continued and intensified, although their 
entrance into the arrangement does not seem likely in the near future.  
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
OSPAR’s efforts to establish MPAs in ABNJ have been marked as pioneering by some,174 while 
others argue that it falls short of its potential.175 After having thoroughly analyzed all elements 
of the MPAs, the latter argument seems most convincing. Due credit must be given, however, 
since OSPAR’s high seas MPA network is the first of its kind. In this sense at least, OSPAR 
can be considered pioneering, as it arguably paved the way for other regional organizations to 
do the same. However, when looking deeper into the content of these MPAs, it becomes evident 
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that much work is to be done for them to be more than just a ‘paper park’. Granted, the legal 
framework within which OSPAR has to operate has severe limitations, as shown in chapter 2. 
But even within this framework, more can be done. There are several measures that should be 
taken to improve the effectivity of these MPAs, e.g. creating site-specific monitoring programs, 
a cooperative enforcement regime among CPs, port States controls, cooperative use of a Vessel 
Monitoring System (VMS) and specific implementation guidelines. These matters will be 
elaborated on in chapter five.  
CHAPTER 4: MPAS IN THE BBNJ NEGOTIATIONS 
4.1 Introduction and historic overview 
Now that the OSPAR MPAs have been analyzed, in this chapter the focus shifts to what is 
happening on the global level: the BBNJ negotiations. The BBNJ-process can broadly be 
divided in three phases: The BBNJ Working Group, Preparatory Committee (PREPCOM), and 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC).  
The first phase was initiated in 2004, when the UNGA established the Ad Hoc Open-Ended 
Informal Working Group to study issues related to the conservation and sustainable use of 
marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction (BBNJ WG).176  
In 2011, at its fourth meeting, the BBNJ WG recommended the UNGA177 to initiate a process 
on the legal framework for the conservation and sustainable use of BBNJ, by identifying gaps 
and ways forward, including through the implementation of existing instruments and the 
possible development of a multilateral agreement under UNCLOS.178 Moreover, it was 
recommended that this process would address, together and as a whole: (i) marine genetic 
resources, including questions on the sharing of benefits; (ii) measures such as area-based 
management tools, including marine protected areas; (iii) environmental impact assessments; 
(iv) capacity-building and the transfer of marine technology.179  
At the ninth meeting of the BBNJ WG in 2014, another set of recommendations to the UNGA 
was made.180 The UNGA was recommended to decide at its 69th session to develop a new 
legally binding instrument on BBNJ under UNCLOS, and to start a negotiating process to that 
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end.181 Moreover, it was recommended to establish a preparatory committee prior to holding an 
intergovernmental conference.182  
The UNGA followed these recommendations, and at its 69th session established the Preparatory 
Committee (PREPCOM).183 The PREPCOM was mandated to make substantive 
recommendations to the General Assembly on the elements of a draft text of an ILBI under 
UNCLOS. The PREPCOM met four times, in 2016 and 2017. In its final report,184 it outlines 
the scope of an ILBI and its relationship with other instruments, guiding approaches and 
principles, as well as the elements of the package.185  
The final phase of the BBNJ-process is the intergovernmental conference (IGC). The UNGA 
decided at its 72nd session to convene the IGC, with the adoption of Resolution 72/249.186 The 
negotiations shall address the topics identified in the ‘package’ that was agreed in 2011. The 
IGC consists of four planned sessions, to be held between 2018 and 2020 – three of which are 
completed at the time of writing. Due to the global COVID-19 pandemic, IGC-4 was postponed 
to the “the earliest possible available date”.187 At the time of writing, no new date has been set. 
Having outlined a brief history of the BBNJ-process, the remainder of this chapter will focus 
of the elements of the BBNJ negotiations that are most relevant for OSPAR’s MPA regime in 
ABNJ. The following section will discuss the over-arching issues of cooperation and 
institutional arrangements. Thereafter, the different elements and processes of MPAs will be 
analyzed, namely: Identification and designation (section 3), implementation, monitoring and 
review (section 4) and enforcement and dispute settlement (section 5). Finally, some brief 
conclusions will be drawn in section 6. 
4.2 Cooperation and Institutional Arrangements 
As was discussed in chapter 2, a variety of activities in ABNJ are being regulated by regional 
and sectoral bodies. This raises questions on how the institutions of this new treaty will interact 
with these bodies. This matter has been a key issue since the very beginning of the BBNJ 
 
181 Ibid., par I (e). 
182 Ibid., par I (e)(i). 
183 UN General Assembly Resolution 69/292 (A/RES/69/292), 19 June 2015. 
184 Report of the Preparatory Committee established by General Assembly resolution 69/292 
(A/AC.287/2017/PC.4/2), 31 July 2017.  
185 T. Kantai et al, ‘Summary of the Third Session of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on the 
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: 19-30 August 
2019’ (2019). 25 Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2. 
186 UN General Assembly Resolution 72/249 (A/RES/72/249), 19 January 2018. 
187 UN General Assembly decision 74/543 (A/DEC/74/543), 11 March 2020. 
29 
 
process, at the early stages of the BBNJ WG.188 Throughout these sessions, delegations 
remained divided on this topic. 
In the letter from the Co-Chairs of the BBNJ WG, in which recommendations are provided to 
the president of the UNGA, this issue of cooperation was addressed by the following phrase: 
“the process […] should not undermine existing relevant legal instruments and frameworks and 
relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies”.189 It has been argued that the term undermine has 
been selected for its ambiguity, in order to break a deadlock in the negotiations.190 This led to 
the inclusion of this phrase in the PREPCOM’s mandate,191 and it has ‘haunted’192 the 
negotiations ever since. During the PREPCOM phase, it was used as an argument by nations 
that opposed the creation of a new global body, as this would ‘undermine’ other instruments 
and frameworks.193 No significant progress was made on this matter, and a similar notion was 
thus included in the mandate of the IGC.194 
Throughout the IGCs, this issue remained controversial. Prior to IGC-2, the ‘Presidents Aid’195 
contained three options for what was later to become article 4 on the ‘Relationship between this 
Agreement and the Convention and relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant 
global, regional, subregional and sectoral bodies’ in the Draft texts. Two of those options had 
a more positive approach to cooperation, focusing on promoting coherence and 
complementarity (option I) and  implementation in a mutually supportive manner (option III). 
Option II contained the notion of ‘not to undermine’.196 In the Draft that was released prior to 
IGC-3, article 4 contained both the ‘not to undermine’ phrase, as well a paragraph that 
essentially merged options I and III of the presidents Aid, as proposed by the EU during IGC-
2.197 Notably, at IGC-3, the deletion of this paragraph was requested by the Core Latin 
American Countries, the Russian Federation, the EU, the African Group, Iceland, Australia, 
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and the IMO.198 In the most recent draft text that was released prior to IGC-4, all that remains 
is: 
“This Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in a manner that [respects the competences of and] does 
not undermine relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant global, regional, subregional and 
sectoral bodies.”199 
It is remarkable that this highly controversial phrase, which was seemingly selected for its 
ambiguity, is included in a draft in this stage of the negotiations. This illustrates how divided 
some delegations still are on this issue, even after over a decade of negotiations. 
As the issue of the relationship of existing bodies and instruments remains contentious, the 
same goes for the institutional arrangements. These are two distinct, yet closely related matters. 
In order to decide on the issue of cooperation, it needs to be clear what the object of this 
cooperation is. Which new bodies will be established, that existing regional and sectoral bodies 
will have to cooperate with? 
In this regard, three main approaches were tabled during negotiations: a global approach, a 
hybrid approach and a regional approach. The former two emerged in early stages of the 
negotiations, while the latter came later - as proposed by New Zealand in the PREPCOM 
phase.200  
The global approach, with strong global institutional arrangements, is mostly popular amongst 
developing States, including the strong blocks of the G-77/China and the African Group. It 
entails a strong COP that establishes ABMTs, including MPAs, and oversees implementation, 
monitoring and review.201 
The regional approach is built on the acknowledgement of the primacy of regional and sectoral 
bodies, favoring weak institutional arrangements. Under this approach, designation of ABMTs, 
including MPAs, implementation of measures and monitoring and review will happen on the 
regional and sectoral level, without global oversight. Some States supporting this approach, 
including OSPAR-members Iceland and Norway, have suggested that the new regime could be 
supported by expanded regional seas programs.202 This approach is popular amongst some 
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developed nations, Russia and Iceland being its most vocal advocates.  
The hybrid approach essentially envisions a system where objectives and timeframes for their 
implementation are set on the global level, which are then to be implemented by States, 
particularly through regional and sectoral organizations.203 This approach is supported by, 
amongst others, New Zealand, Japan, Australia, Switzerland and Chile. 
Two options can be derived from the most recent Draft text. Firstly, a variant in which ABMTs, 
including MPAs are designated by the COP, along with conservation measures, while “taking 
into account existing measures under relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant 
global, regional and sectoral bodies, as appropriate”.204 Such instruments and bodies play a role 
in the implementation of management measures. This approach could be placed somewhere in 
between the global and hybrid model. 
The second option, clearly embodying a strong regional approach, merely gives the COP the 
power to identify potential sites and make recommendations on conservation measures, whilst 
acknowledging the primary authority of relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant 
global, regional and sectoral bodies.205 
Besides a COP, a scientific and technical bod and a secretariat are also likely to be 
established.206 The exact role of these institutions, and the role of any potential subsidiary 
bodies remains subject to debate.207 It remains to be seen how these matters will develop during 
IGC-4, and perhaps during additional sessions. For OSPAR and other regional and sectoral 
bodies, these issues are of critical importance, as they can potentially drastically change their 
role and competence in ABNJ.  
In the following sections, the processes in relation to AMBTs, including MPAs will be 
discussed in more detail. 
4.3 Identification and Designation 
The first stage in establishing AMBTs, including MPAs, is identification of potential sites. 
Some controversial matters, in this regard, remain. One point of disagreement is the role of the 
scientific and technical body in relation to these criteria. It has been proposed to let the scientific 
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and technical body (further) develop the criteria.208 Secondly, some individual criteria which 
are listed in an Annex to the Draft text, are controversial – including climate change209 and the 
inclusion of social and economic factors.210 The list of criteria that are on the table is extensive, 
as shown in figure 3.1 below, and needs further work. As pointed out by Norway during IGC-
3, “we may end up with every part of the ocean requiring special treatment”.211 The Draft further 
provides in article 16 that the criteria are non-exhaustive and indicative.  
Once a potential site has been identified through these criteria, a proposal can be made. The 
draft outlines the following procedure: State Parties, individually or collectively, submit a 
proposal to the Secretariat,212 which then transmits the proposal to the scientific and technical 
body for a preliminary review. Thereafter, a consultation procedure is initiated, in which 
regional and sectoral bodies play a central role.213 The revised proposal is then re-submitted to 















Figure 3.1: List of identification criteria
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Negotiating parties seem to have reached near consensus on this process. Unsurprising 
exceptions are Iceland and the Russian Federation, avid supporters of a strictly regional 
approach – with the Russian Federation going as far to propose the deletion of the provision on 
Proposals in its entirety or moving it to an Annex.216  
Some issues nonetheless remain controversial. First of all, some delegations are divided on the 
question whether to accompany the proposal with a management plan, conservation and 
management measures, or to let the COP identify such plans/measures.217 Secondly, some 
delegations – most fanatically the Russian Federation – advocate time-bound AMBTs, 
including MPAs.218 Others, including the EU, support regularly reviewing MPAs. Furthermore, 
the question whether adjacent coastal States should have special rights remains very 
contentious.219 Finally, the decision-making process is an issue on which no convergence can 
thus far be observed. During IGC-2, many countries supported consensus-based decision 
making, including the African Group, China and the US.220 The Like-Minded Latin American 
Countries and New Zealand supported other measures in case of non-consensus.221 At IGC-3 
this matter was discussed in the so called ‘informal-informals’ (formal, more closed sessions), 
facilitated by Revell (New Zealand) who reported “diverging views on whether decision 
making should be only by consensus, or a fallback voting mechanism should be contemplated 
in cases where consensus cannot be reached”.222 
A related, but separate issue is the recognition of existing MPAs that were established by 
relevant regional and sectoral bodies. Automatic recognition of such MPAs has been tabled, as 
well as creating a “recognition process”.223 Both these options were included in the President’s 
Aid that formed the foundation for the negotiations at IGC-2,224 followed by a paragraph that 
provides that non-recognition under the ILBI “shall not affect the legal effect of that 
measure”.225 During the discussion on this provision at IGC-2, Australia and the Russian 
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Federation opposed the formal notion of ‘recognition’ in the text.226 On the other hand, the 
Like-Minded Latin American Countries advocated “a global overarching framework for the 
recognition and establishment of ABMTs to complement measures designated under existing 
regional and sectoral bodies” 227 (emphasis added). Notably, in the Draft that was released prior 
to IGC-3, no provision on recognition was included. During IGC-3, the issue was nonetheless 
brought up again by the EU, proposing to use the identification criteria for recognizing existing 
MPAs, gaining support from the Pacific Small Island Developing States.228 This brief 
discussion did not lead to the inclusion of a provision on recognition in the latest Draft. 
However, this shows that ‘recognition’ is still a topic of debate and could still be included in 
the text in a later stage of the negotiations. If the eventual BBNJ-treaty does remain silent on 
this issue, an option for existing bodies that have established ABMTs, including MPAs, would 
be to follow the ‘regular’ proposal procedure as described above. This procedure allows for 
parties to collectively submit proposals. Through this mechanism, regional and sectoral bodies 
could achieve recognition of existing MPAs. This process does, however, seem sub-optimal 
and burdensome on regional bodies.  
4.4 Implementation, Monitoring and Review 
Solid implementation, monitoring and review mechanisms are crucial for an effective network 
of AMBTs and MPAs in ABNJ. Before diving into this topic, one thing must be pointed out, 
namely that discussions about implementation, monitoring and review are closely linked to the 
matters of cooperation and institutional arrangements, as examined in section 2. It should be 
kept in mind that the outcome of these discussions will – for al large part - determine on what 
level implementation, monitoring and review take place (globally, or (sub)regionally). In this 
regard, the suggestion of the EU, US and Japan to address these issues in more detail once 
delegations have a better understanding of the obligations under the ILBI,229 seems logical. 
Within the BBNJ negotiations, discussions about implementation have two dimensions: 
Implementation of the ILBI as a whole (Draft article 53), and the specific implementation of 
part III ABMTs, including MPAs (Draft article 20).  
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During IGC-2, broad support was noted for implementation on the national level.230 This is 
reflected in Draft article 20 (1) on implementation of part III, providing that States “shall ensure 
that activities under their jurisdiction or control that take place in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction are conducted consistently with the decisions adopted under this Part”,231 and article 
53 (1), applicable to the ILBI as a whole, obliging States to take the necessary legislative, 
administrative and policy matters.232 Another provision worth mentioning is article 20 (6),233 
which provides that: 
“A State Party that is not a participant in a relevant legal instrument or framework, or a member 
of a relevant global, regional, subregional or sectoral body, and that does not otherwise agree to 
apply the conservation and management measures established under such instruments, 
frameworks or bodies is not discharged from the obligation to cooperate”234 
This article mimics article 17 of the Fish Stocks Agreement,235 which builds on the obligation 
to cooperate in the conservation and management of living resources of article 119 UNCLOS. 
In the context of the FSA, this provision has, in conjunction with article 8 (4), the consequence 
that States that do not comply with their duty to cooperate have no access to fish stocks. The 
inclusion of a similar provision in the BBNJ-treaty would clearly have very different 
consequences, given the different objectives of the treaties. The foundation of this provision 
would be article 197, which entails a duty to cooperate for the protection and preservation of 
the marine environment, instead of article 119 UNCLOS on living resources. Most importantly, 
whereas under the FSA the potential loss of access to fish stocks creates a strong stimulus for 
States to comply to their duty to cooperate, such a stimulus is hard to imagine in the context of 
MPAs in BBNJ. The value of this provision also depends on the type of institutional framework 
that is chosen, as well as on the issue of recognition. In regional model without a recognition-
mechanism, States that are not a member to a regional body are not bound to the measures 
adopted by that body. The inclusion of this provision will effectively qualify the already 
existing obligation to cooperate of third States, so that they are under a duty to comply to these 
measures nonetheless. 
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One issue of controversy is what role the COP will play in implementation. At IGC-3, diverging 
opinions in this regard can be observed. The US and China opposed review by the COP, while 
the EU and New Zealand were in favor of such a mechanism.236  
As for monitoring and review, during the ‘informal-informals’ at IGC-3 on this topic, strong 
support for a structure consisting of States reporting on implementation, and monitoring and 
review by a scientific and technical body was reported.237 This is reflected in article 21 of the 
Draft text. The first paragraph provides that reports on implementation will be made publicly 
available by the secretariat.238 Moreover, the Scientific and Technical Body will monitor and 
periodically review AMBTs, including MPAs, including related conservation measures.239  
4.5 Enforcement and Compliance 
As discussed in chapter 2, no State enjoys enforcement powers in ABNJ, except when explicitly 
provided for in limited scenarios.240 Early on in the negotiations it became clear that 
enforcement measures in the BBNJ treaty needed to be consistent with UNCLOS.241 Granted, 
a treaty that is only applicable in ABNJ may at first sight not lend itself well for a 
comprehensive enforcement scheme. However, there are options that could function within the 
existing UNCLOS framework, without ‘undermining’ it. Flag State enforcement is the first 
option that comes to mind. States could be obliged to enforce measures on vessels flying its 
flag, a system that is used by the FSA.242 Another alternative would be the use of port State 
measures (also used by the FSA),243 building on the broad enforcement powers of port States 
granted by article 218 UNCLOS.244 It has been proposed to introduce regional and sub-regional 
enforcement committees, also based on the FSA, but this proposal did not gain wide support 
and no follow-up was made.245 
No such mechanisms are currently on the table during the BBNJ negotiations. Even though 
some form enforcement scheme was initially widely supported during the early Working 
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Groups,246 influential delegations favoring a ‘soft’ treaty, such as the Russian Federation, China 
and the US, successfully wiped this idea off the table. 
What is left, is a very weak compliance mechanism. During IGC-3, States were still divided on 
whether to include a such a mechanism, and to what extent. China opposed a reference in the 
Draft to the COP “addressing cases of non-compliance”, whereas the US opposed a compliance 
mechanism altogether.247 Australia and Canada, on the other hand, called for addressing non-
compliance in a constructive way.248 It has also been suggested to create a compliance 
committee that reports to the COP.249 In Draft article 53 (3), it is provided that the COP “shall 
consider and adopt cooperative procedures and institutional mechanisms to promote 
compliance […] and to address non-compliance”. The meaning of the formulation “cooperative 
procedures and institutional mechanisms” cannot be derived from the wording of this rather 
vague provision, nor from the documentary history of the negotiations. This provision appears 
to be inspired by the CBD’s Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing.250 Reviewing this 
instrument provides some more insight in what this draft provision might entail. Article 30 of 
this Protocol mimics draft article 53 (3), and additionally provides that “these procedures and 
mechanisms shall include provisions to offer advice or assistance, where appropriate”.251 This 
is clearly a very ‘soft’ mechanism, which will not do wonders for compliance. Excluding this 
part of the provision could mean that the drafters envision a stronger system, but this remains 
to be seen. 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
The BBNJ treaty is a treaty ‘under construction’. Negotiations are ongoing and delegations are 
still very divided on a variety of topics. Therefore, any analysis of this topic remains 
speculative, to some extent. Nonetheless, the form and shape of this new treaty can roughly be 
derived from the negotiation reports and draft articles, and what is emerging is not what many 
had hoped for. The treaty that is currently on the table will not drastically alter the legal regime 
in ABNJ (as illustrated in chapter 2), and lacks strong enforcement and compliance 
mechanisms, as showcased in section 6. It can even be expected that things will be narrowed 
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down even further, in order to reach consensus. As observed by Mendenhall et al, “signals thus 
far suggest that consensus may be achieved by softening the agreed-upon rules, keeping the 
level of precision, obligation, and delegation low enough to decrease the difficulty and cost of 
ratifying the eventual BBNJ agreement.”252  
However, more positive conclusions can also be drawn. As illustrated in sections 3 and 4, the 
ILBI will offer a structured approach to establishing, implementing and monitoring AMBTs, 
including MPAs. Whereas OSPAR’s MPAs can arguably be labelled as ‘paper parks’, the future 
BBNJ MPAs certainly have the potential to be more effective. The next chapter will further 
elaborate on how the ILBI, besides offering a more structured approach, appears to give a more 
prominent role to science, and has a more transparent and flexible approach.  
CHAPTER 5: Institutional dynamics between OSPAR and the BBNJ ILBI 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, the regimes for MPAs in ABNJ of OSPAR the BBNJ ILBI have been 
analyzed. This chapter will discuss the potential institutional dynamics between these two 
instruments, looking at the three institutional concepts of the ILBI that were discussed in the 
previous chapter (regional, hybrid and global). It will become evident that all these outcomes 
have positive elements, and can potentially offer a favorable and workable outcome - albeit in 
different ways. As the BBNJ negotiations are still ongoing, this analysis is tentative, and the 
value of each model is highly dependent on the details of the final outcome. 
Before starting the analysis, two issues must be pointed out. Firstly, it must be noted that these 
approaches are merely concepts, and that they are not worked out in great detail. This analysis 
therefore remains speculative, to some degree, and attempts to outline the contours of this 
cooperation, rather than the specifics. Secondly, it must be stressed that, as shown in chapter 4, 
the institutional aspects of the ILBI are a controversial issue on which the negotiating States are 
still divided. The three approaches that are discussed in this chapter are merely concepts, and 
the arrangements that will eventually emerge can have many forms. To illustrate this, one could 
imagine a spectrum, with on one side a global approach with a strong institutional arrangements, 
and on the other side a strictly regional approach without global oversight by a COP. The hybrid 
approach lies somewhere in the middle of two extremes. Many more institutional approaches 
could be imagined, to placed anywhere on this spectrum. However, for the sake of clarity, the 
discussion below will focus on these three concepts.  
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The following section looks at the cooperation between OSPAR and the ILBI in a global model. 
Section 3 discusses the hybrid approach, and section 4 the regional approach. Lastly, in section 
5 some general conclusions are drawn.  
5.2 Global approach 
The scenario of a global approach will have the most far-reaching consequences for OSPAR. 
Delegations supporting this approach called for a global mechanism to employ a centralized, 
comprehensive approach over activities in ABNJ.253 The COP will have the competence to 
establish ABMTs, including MPAs, and oversee implementation, monitoring and review. It 
needs to be stressed that this does not mean that regional bodies like OSPAR will be sidelined 
– the idea is to draw on the expertise of such bodies,254 however their exact role remains unclear. 
The complex question of the exact legal relationship between OSPAR and the ILBI falls outside 
of the scope of this thesis.255 It suffices here to emphasize that a hierarchy between the ILBI 
and OSPAR would be established. This is often seen as a an undesirable situation, in particular 
by some developed States that argue that this would ‘undermine’ existing regional and sectoral 
bodies. Indeed, OSPAR would lose some of its autonomy, and distant States could make 
proposals for ABMTs, including MPAs, in OSPAR’s maritime area. However, it seems 
unlikely that this will happen, given that the proposal procedure that is currently on the table is 
rather lengthy and requires extensive data collection. It certainly seems more likely that the 
OSPAR member States will instead (individually or collectively) make proposals. States should 
nonetheless be cautious of the potential influence of distant States.256 
As outlined in chapter 3, one of the issues that OSPAR encounters when establishing MPAs in 
ABNJ, is that conservation measures in such an MPA can only be imposed on the parties that 
agreed to its establishment, in accordance with the pacta tertiis principle. One advantage of the 
global model is that MPAs that are established through the ILBI are binding on all its member 
States.  
A legal issue that can be raised in this regard, is whether these MPAs are binding on States that 
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are parties to UNCLOS, but not to the ILBI. The underlying legal issue here is that of third 
States, which is addressed in section 4 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).257 The general rule is that a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third 
State without its consent.258 Non-members of the ILBI are thus, in principle, not bound by these 
MPAs. One interesting way through which third States can nonetheless be bound by the ILBI 
is through GAIRAS.259 As discussed in chapter 2, one unique characteristic of UNCLOS is that 
States can be bound by rules contained in certain Conventions to which they are not a member, 
if those rules can be classified as GAIRAS in UNCLOS. One provision of particular relevance 
in relation to MPAs is article 211 (2) UNCLOS, providing that States shall adopt laws for the 
prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels flying their flag, which at least have 
the same effect as that of generally accepted international rules and standards.260 If in a global 
approach, the ILBI sets global pollution standards that are applicable in all MPAs that are 
created under it, these rules could become GAIRAS. It can be said that such an interpretation 
is in line with the objectives of part XII of UNCLOS. States are not only under an obligation to 
protect and preserve the marine environment, but also to cooperate to this end.261  
Another question that should be mentioned in relation to the global model, is what happens to 
OSPAR’s existing MPA network in ABNJ. This is of key importance to OSPAR, and involves 
the issue of ‘recognition’ as discussed in chapter 4. The inclusion of a recognition process, or 
automatic recognition of existing MPAs, is arguably aligned with the overarching objectives of 
the global model. It would lead to defragmentation of different instruments in ABNJ, resulting 
in a more centralized regime. From OSPAR’s perspective, automatic recognition would be most 
favorable, for two reasons. Firstly, since it would be least burdensome for OSPAR. If instead a 
recognition process is chosen, OSPAR would presumably have to provide data and perhaps 
even make adjustment to the regulatory framework of its MPAs to ‘fit’ the ILBI’s framework. 
Secondly, as argued by the Like-Minded Latin American Countries at IGC-2, “the BBNJ 
instrument should not evaluate ABMTs by regional and sectoral bodies but rather ensure their 
compatibility with other instruments”.262 This positive approach to cooperation should be 
pursued, as it will contribute to increased integration of sectoral and regional bodies in the ILBI.  
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The issue of recognition raises similar legal questions as those discussed above, in regard to 
third States. In this case, however, it is about third States to OSPAR, that are members to both 
the ILBI and UNCLOS. Can these States be bound to measures taken by OSPAR, if its MPAs 
are to be recognized under the ILBI? Again, the basic rule is that no obligation arises for third 
States without their consent.263 What it comes down to, is whether signing and ratifying the 
ILBI can be classified as ‘consent’. In the author’s view, the answer is yes. With the inclusion 
of a recognition mechanism in the ILBI, the negotiating States implicitly give their consent to 
be bound by measures created by regional bodies. After all, this is the very purpose of such a 
mechanism. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that consent does not mean to join a certain 
instrument. As noted by Kolb: “Given that the third State accepts the rights or obligations, it 
‘participates’, through its consent, to some partial extent in the treaty.” 264  
To sum up: the global approach will create a hierarchy, and it is likely that OSPAR would lose 
some of its autonomy, and will need to adapt its existing mechanisms to this new governance 
system. This would impose a major burden on OSPAR. Hence, its CPs will presumably not be 
very sympathetic to this approach. However, as shown in chapter 3, these existing MPA 
mechanisms have significant shortcomings. Such reforms would, although burdensome, almost 
certainly lead to improvements. A well worked-out global model could significantly strengthen 
OSPAR’s efforts in ABNJ. Besides the advantage that conservation measures will be applicable 
to all ILBI-member States, such a model can lead to improved and strengthened implementation 
and monitoring mechanisms. However, for such a model to function, recognition of OSPAR’s 
existing MPAs is essential, and the question of the exact relationship between OSPAR and the 
ILBI needs to be carefully worked out. 
5.3 Hybrid approach 
If the negotiations instead result in a hybrid model, the BBNJ COP will set objectives and 
timeframes, which are then to be implemented by regional bodies like OSPAR. This variant 
would still result in a hierarchical relationship between the BBNJ COP and OSPAR, however 
to a much lesser degree. OSPAR will maintain most of its competences, and fewer – if any, 
adaptations will be required. Several degrees of hybridity are possible, as this approach can be 
placed anywhere on the spectrum in between the global and regional models. A variant that is 
leaning more towards the global side is reflected in the current article 19 of the draft, in which 
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the COP can establish ABMTs, including MPAs, whilst taking into account existing measures 
from regional bodies.265 The COP can furthermore recommend OSPAR members to promote 
the adoption of conservation measures, and adopt measures complementary to the existing 
measures under OSPAR.266 OSPAR would maintain its competence to establish MPAs through 
its already existing mechanisms,267 which would then potentially have to go through a 
recognition process. For the hybrid model to function effectively, the inclusion of such a process 
is desirable – although not as essential as it is for the global approach. The hybrid approach 
leaves more room to regional bodies to implement measures to their discretion, which will 
inevitably lead to a lesser degree of global uniformity compared to the global approach. 
However, especially from the perspective of OSPAR, it would significantly enhance the 
effectivity of existing MPAs and measures if they were to be binding upon all member States 
to the BBNJ treaty.  
A major advantage of the hybrid approach, from OSPAR’s perspective, is that it will not require 
any drastic adaptations. The standards that are set on the global level will need to be 
implemented, however this can be done through the existing processes within OSPAR – 
including the existing MoUs and the Collective Arrangement with NEAFC. Moreover, 
OSPAR’s competences in ABNJ would presumably be strengthened, for two reasons. Firstly, 
because the objectives and timeframes that are set on the global level by the ILBI could form a 
strong incentive for OSPAR parties to intensify its activities in ABNJ. As shown in chapter 3, 
progress on establishing new MPAs in ABNJ has been sluggish since 2012. This model of 
global standard-setting and time-frames could be as a strong incentive for OSPAR’s CPs to 
pick up the pace. Again, the mechanisms to do so are already in place. Secondly, the same effect 
can be expected within sectoral bodies like the IMO and the ISA, which could lead to improved 
coordination and cooperation (i.e. by joining the Collective Arrangement). 
An argument against this approach could is that it can be viewed as a compromise: A result of 
lengthy discussions between delegations favoring global- or regional models, and in particular 
some developed nations endlessly reiterating that a global framework would undermine existing 
bodies and instruments. It must be kept in mind that the BBNJ negotiations were initiated 
because of common understanding in the international community that the existing legal 
framework in ABNJ is insufficient to protect biodiversity, as shown by the analysis in chapter 
2. The conclusions drawn in chapter 3, that OSPAR’s MPAs in ABNJ are lacking on many 
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aspects, are largely a consequence of this. It would arguably be a missed opportunity if what 
results is a ‘soft’268 treaty. As stated by De Lucia, the BBNJ negotiations are an opportunity to 
“rethink” the boundaries of ocean governance.269 A hybrid model does not drastically change 
the governance model in ABNJ. Although OSPAR might benefit from it nonetheless, as argued 
above, it is also not unthinkable that not much will change. After all, in many regions, regional 
bodies aimed at protecting the marine environment are non-existent or not very well-developed. 
A scenario in which the global standards and time-frames will focus on these regions, and set 
thresholds accordingly, is not unlikely.  
In sum, the hybrid approach could be a good outcome for OSPAR. The inclusion of a 
recognition process is, again, highly desirable in order to ensure its existing network of MPAs 
can be integrated into the BBNJ framework. Moreover, the objectives that are set by the ILBI 
should be tailored for each region. Matters that should be taken into account in this regard are 
the characteristics of the marine environment and the ecosystems; the existence of a regional 
body to protect the marine environment; the advancement of such a body, particularly in regard 
to MPAs; the role of - and cooperation with sectoral bodies in the region. This way, tailor-made 
objectives can be set that will form an incentive for OSPAR to improve its MPA regime in 
ABNJ. Lastly, the question of the relationship between regional and sectoral bodies and the 
ILBI, and the cooperation between these instruments needs to be carefully considered. The 
overarching provision on this in the Draft text is article 4, and as shown in the previous chapter, 
the phrase ‘not to undermine’ forms the central tenet of this provision, as it has been selected 
at the expense of more positive phrasings promoting coherence and complementarity. This is 
regrettable, as such terms “offer an interpretive approach more apt to foster the integration of 
exiting instruments, bodies and institutions and the ILBI in a manner that contributes to more 
effective ocean governance”.270  
5.4 Regional approach 
The regional approach relies heavily on existing institutions, and recognizes the primacy of 
regional and sectoral bodies. Only certain core functions of the ILBI would fall under the 
mandate of the BBNJ’s COP,271 but the establishment, implementation and monitoring of 
ABMTs, including MPAs, would be left to regional and sectoral bodies. Importantly, in this 
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scenario there will not be a hierarchical relationship between OSPAR and the BBNJ-COP. 
Moreover, if a regional model emerges it is unlikely that a recognition mechanism will be 
included.272 Those States supporting a regional approach argue that the ILBI could strengthen 
the effectiveness of existing bodies by creating mechanisms for collaboration between and 
among regional and sectoral bodies, limiting the ILBI to setting standards and principles for 
regional and sectoral bodies’ consideration.273 Within OSPAR, such a mechanism already 
exists, in the form of the Collective Arrangement. As shown in chapter 2, the Collective 
Arrangement (CA) aims to be a “a collective and multilateral forum composed of all competent 
entities addressing the management of human activities” in the North-East Atlantic.274 This 
illustrates that OSPAR already has processes in place that could be required in a BBNJ-
framework with a regional approach. Besides OSPAR’s efforts to cooperate across sectors, it 
is also the leading regional body when it comes to establishing MPAs in ABNJ.275 Therefore, 
OSPAR will presumably be able to carry on with business as usual, and no adaptation will be 
required. This could be viewed as an advantage of the regional approach. However, the opposite 
could be argued more convincingly. One major issue that is inherent to the regional approach 
is fragmentation. Currently, over 190 global or regional agreements applicable in ABNJ.276 
Different sectoral and regional bodies have their own types of ABMTs or MPAs, with varying 
objectives, scopes, and regulations.277 The legal regime in ABNJ is thus already very 
fragmented, and a regional model without global oversight will only lead to deepened 
fragmentation. This is primarily an issue from a global perspective, in particular for sectoral 
bodies with a global competence, such as the IMO and the ISA. For such organizations it is a 
challenge to cooperate with regional bodies, given the disparity of these regimes. It can be 
argued that a more centralized and streamlined model would make it significantly easier to 
cooperate with regional bodies, since it allows for more of a one-size-fits-all approach for 
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sectoral bodies when cooperating in different reasons. As this could lead to these bodies being 
eager to cooperate with regional bodies, it could in turn have a positive carryover to OSPAR. 
Fragmentation and varying degrees of protection in different areas is inherent to the regional 
approach. This does not mean that this approach is by default a bad outcome. The key is to 
work it out in such a manner that all these different instruments and bodies can collaborate and 
to create an integrated system. An example of such a regional model has recently been proposed 
by Iceland.278 In a comment on the revised draft that was prepared after IGC-3, submitted at the 
invitation of IGC-president Lee, Iceland suggests a regional approach in which cooperation 
between relevant international legal instruments and frameworks and global, regional and 
sectoral bodies is conducted through a regional “consultation process”.279 This process is to be 
formalized either as an international body, or by giving one of the participants the role of 
administrator.280 The similarities with OSPAR’s Collective Arrangement are obvious. It has 
been said that this proposal seems to suggest a “a multiplication of Collective Arrangements.”281 
For OSPAR, such a model would arguably be desirable, as it builds on and strengthens its 
existing mechanisms, and requires no adaptations to existing mechanisms. If, however, a 
regional model emerges that does not contain such coopering mechanisms, and instead merely 
emphasized that the ILBI should ‘not undermine’ regional and sectoral bodies, it would 
arguably be a very dissatisfying outcome for OSPAR. The gaps and flaws of the existing regime 
in ABNJ, as analyzed in chapter 2, would remain, as well as the weaknesses of OSPAR’s MPA 
network in ABNJ. 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter analyzed the future cooperation of OSPAR and the BBNJ ILBI. It has been shown 
that each of the institutional models of the ILBI can potentially be a good outcome for OSPAR, 
albeit in different ways. This conclusion is of particular importance in relation to the ‘not to 
undermine’ controversy. Some delegations are primarily concerned with avoiding the creation 
of a treaty that duplicates mandates, overlaps existing competences and therefore undermines 
existing bodies. The North-East Atlantic is perhaps the best region to take as an example in this 
regard, since OSPAR is very active in ABNJ in comparison to other regional instruments. 
 
278 Textual proposals submitted by delegations by 20 February 2020, in response to the invitation by the 
President of the Conference in her Note of 18 November 2019 (A/CONF.232/2020/3) 52. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid. 
281 V De Lucia, ‘Squaring the Oceanic Circle? On Regional Approaches to the Conservation of Marine 




Therefore, in this region it is simply not possible to create a new global MPA regime without 
encroaching on OSPAR’s competences and mandate. This does, however, not mean that 
OSPAR will be ‘undermined’ by the ILBI. The contrary is the case. As has been shown, 
regardless of which institutional model emerges, they all have the potential to strengthen 
OSPAR’s MPA regime. This conclusion calls for a fundamentally different approach to the 
institutional arrangement of the ILBI. Instead of being overly cautious of undermining existing 
instruments, emphasis should be placed on creating synergies and complementarity, to 
ultimately strengthen regional instruments. Such an approach is in line with the overall 
objectives of UNCLOS to protect and preserve the marine environment, and to cooperate to 
this end.  
CHAPTER 6: THE MPA PROCESS 
6.1 Introduction 
Whereas the previous chapter focused on the institutional dynamics between OSPAR and the 
ILBI, this chapter will examine the processes for establishing and implementing MPAs within 
these instruments. Chapter 3 has shown that OSPAR’s MPA regime falls short of its potential; 
it lacks solid implementation mechanisms, site-specific monitoring, and any type of 
enforcement scheme. The purpose of this chapter is to assess to what extent these shortcomings 
can be ‘filled in’ by the BBNJ ILBI, and to identify fundamental elements of an effective MPA 
regime. This is done by comparing the three stages of MPA governance of OSPAR and the 
ILBI: Identification and designation (section 2); implementation, monitoring and review 
(section 3); enforcement and compliance (section 4). 
Before diving into this analysis, it should be emphasized that the MPA-process is closely linked 
to the institutional elements as discussed above. In a strong regional model, for example, 
ABMTs, including MPAs would be established by regional and sectoral bodies, and there 
would be no overarching global mechanism. Thus, for the sake of this analysis, a hybrid 
approach scenario will be assumed, which contains a process through which AMBTs, including 
MPAs can be established on the global level. This is not merely assumed for practical purposes; 
it has been argued that this is a likely outcome of the negotiations.282 When looking at the 
history of the BBNJ process, this indeed seems likely. Opponents of the global- and regional 
approaches have been divided since the very beginning of the negotiations, and their positions 
have not drastically changed. A compromise will have to be made, presumably in the form of 
 
282 Kraabel K D, supra note 13, 8. 
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some type of hybrid approach. Moreover, the treaty that is currently reflected in the Draft does 
describe a process to designate, implement and monitor ABMTs, including MPAs. 
6.2 Identification and Designation 
The first stage in the MPA-process is the identification of sites. Both OSPAR and the (draft) 
ILBI use their own set of criteria, as shown in figure 5.1. Although there is some overlap 
between these criteria, some differences can also be observed. Whereas the BBNJ-criteria are 
mostly purely biological, OSPAR’s criteria embody a more practical approach (e.g. scientific 
value, potential damage by human activities, size, potential success of management measures). 
The manner in which the criteria are applied also differs significantly. One important difference 
is that the approach of the BBNJ ILBI is more flexible. Contrarily, as shown in chapter 3, 
OSPAR has a fairly detailed two-stage identification process which relies heavily on the 
exhaustive list of identification criteria.283 In the ILBI, in contrast, the criteria in the current 
draft are merely indicative, and they can be further developed by the Scientific and Technical 
Body.284  
OSPAR285 BBNJ286 
Threatened or declining species and habitats/biotopes Special importance for the life history stages of 
species 
Important species and habitats/biotopes Special importance of the species found therein 
Ecological significance The importance for threatened, endangered or 
declining species or habitats 




Naturalness Biological diversity 
Size Dependency 
Potential for restoration Ecological connectivity 
Potential for success of management measures Important ecological processes occurring therein 
Potential damage to the area by human activities Slow recovery and resilience 
Scientific value Adequacy and viability 
 Replication 
Figure 5.1: Identification criteria of OSPAR / BBNJ  
 
 
283 OSPAR Agreement 2003-17. 
284 Revised draft, supra note 199, article 16 (3). 
285 OSPAR Agreement: 2003-17. 
286 Revised draft, supra note 199, Appendix I. Criteria that are placed in ‘brackets’ are not included. 
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In chapter 3 it was concluded that OSPAR’s identification and designation processes have their 
shortcomings. It was explicitly recognized by the CPs that there is no coordinated approach to 
select sites in ABNJ.287 Whereas for MPAs within national jurisdiction, a detailed proposal 
procedure is in place, no such a mechanism exists for MPAs in ABNJ.288 Here, the contrast 
with the BBNJ ILBI is abundantly clear. A detailed proposal procedure is expected to be put in 
place; it is clearly provided how proposals are to be submitted and what elements they shall 
include.289 Importantly, the Scientific and Technical Body is likely to play a central role 
throughout this process. This is certainly a strength of the BBNJ regime. To avoid politization 
of MPA governance, it is of key importance to have solid scientific input throughout the 
processes. Although the ILBI’s Scientific and Technical Body will presumably not have the 
competence to identify sites – which is regrettable, it plays a key role in the assessment of 
proposals. The same cannot be said for OSPAR. As it has no scientific body of its own, it instead 
cooperates with ICES. However, ICES is not involved in any stage of OSPAR’s MPA process. 
Another important difference between the proposal procedures of these instruments is the role 
of NGOs. Within OSPAR, as shown above, they play a central role in the identification process. 
Whereas the CPs have been very reluctant to make proposals for sites in ABNJ, NGOs have 
been actively doing so. This discrepancy is not surprising, given the different interests and 
purpose of NGOs as opposed to States. Whereas States are primarily concerned with their own 
(economic) interests, certain NGOs revolve around their purpose to protect the (marine) 
environment.290 For States, the process of collecting data and making proposals for areas that 
are located far off their shores could be seen as burdensome, as it is not in their direct 
(economic) interest. It can therefore be expected that, similar to OSPAR, the BBNJ member 
States will not make many proposals. NGOs should thus be allowed as Observers to the BBNJ-
COP, thereby allowing them to get involved in the MPA-process. This would have three 
advantages: It creates a better balance of interests; it takes away some of the workload from the 
member States; and it will lead to more proposals being made. As shown in OSPAR, it suffices 
to merely allow NGOs to participate and provide information, without getting a right to vote. 
This model has proven to be successful, given the profound influence NGO’s have had on 
OSPAR’s MPA network in ABNJ.  
 
287 ICG-MPA 2011, supra note 116, par. 4.16. 
288 Revised draft, supra note 199, article 17. 
289 Ibid. 
290 This can perhaps not be said for all NGOs, as some serve different purposes, but at least for e.g. WWF and 
GreenPeace, which are both very active in OSPAR. 
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It has to be seen what role Observers will play in the BBNJ-COP, if any. This is currently not 
a topic of debate at the negotiations. This is perhaps not surprising, given the fact that some 
major issues remain unresolved – most importantly the type of institutional model that will be 
used. Indeed, at this point it is not even set in stone if a COP will be established. It nonetheless 
seems unlikely that NGOs will be able to play a role in the ILBI, since no States are currently 
actively advocating this. Perhaps voices in favor of this will arise once the important 
institutional questions are answered, but this does not seem likely. However, even if the final 
treaty does not regulate the admission of Observers, the Rules of Procedure that are to be 
adopted by the COP291 may be a final resort.292 Again, it would suffice to merely let NGOs 
attend meetings and provide information for them to have a significant impact on the MPA 
regime.  
In sum, it can be said that the approach of the ILBI offers a more coordinated and structured 
approach to establishing MPAs. This is not surprising, since this regime is tailored specifically 
for areas beyond national jurisdiction. The same cannot be said about OSPAR’s MPA regime 
in ABNJ, which is scattered across different decisions, recommendations and other soft-law 
documents, and lacks a detailed and coordinated process to identify sites and establish MPAs 
in ABNJ. However, one important strength of this regime is the role of NGOs as Observers, 
which could be a suitable model to include in the ILBI.  
6.3 Implementation, monitoring and review 
It has been shown in chapter 3 that OSPAR’s implementation and monitoring mechanisms in 
ABNJ are very weak. The decisions and recommendations that establish these MPAs, forming 
the basis for implementation, are generally soft-law in nature and do not contain strong 
obligations. Instead, the substantive parts of these documents are mostly framed in the form of 
objectives, which do not lend themselves well of direct implementation. Since the BBNJ ILBI 
is still being developed, there are no decisions of the BBNJ COP to assess and compare this to. 
It can nonetheless be observed that the general implementation obligations of the ILBI are 
significantly stronger than those within OSPAR. The ILBI will presumably oblige its members 
to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction and control are conducted consistently with the 
decisions adopted in relation to ABMTs, including MPAs.293 Moreover, member States shall 
 
291 As reflected in article 48 (3) of the most recent Draft, supra note 199. 
292 Although the admission of Observers is an issue that is regulated in main Convention text in most cases (i.e., 
OSPAR (art. 11) Barcelona Convention (art. 20), FSA (art. 12 (2)), but some exceptions exist (i.e., the IWC). 
293 Revised draft, supra note 199, Article 20 (1). 
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take necessary legislative, administrative and policy measures.294 The OSPAR Convention 
contains no such obligations, nor do the decisions that establishes these MPAs. It is merely 
provided in the recommendations on the management of the MPAs that Parties should 
implement the ‘management framework’ (the decision and the recommendation) for the MPAs. 
Implementation is thus largely left to the discretion and goodwill of the CPs. Parties are 
expected (again, they should) to report on implementation. It has previously been concluded 
that this reporting obligation is taken loosely, given the low number of reports that is received 
by the ICG-MPA. Importantly, these reports are not made publicly available. Even in the bi-
annual MPA Status Reports no information from these reports is published. It can safely be 
assumed that implementation is either not happening at all, or at best very sluggishly. The ILBI 
certainly has a more transparent approach to implementation, since implementation reports will 
be made publicly available. This is arguably important, since general concern about the state of 
the marine environment is increasing, and parties that are not fulfilling their obligations can be 
held accountable by NGOs and the general public.  
As for monitoring, it has been shown that OSPAR has no site-specific monitoring programs in 
place. It is therefore unknown whether the MPAs in ABNJ are moving towards their 
objectives.295 Instead of setting up site-specific monitoring programs in collaboration with 
ICES, OSPAR leaves this task to its CPs, which are urged to “identify suitable mechanisms for 
monitoring the achievement of the conservation objectives”.296 The ILBI, on the other hand, 
offers a more structured approach to monitoring, in which the Scientific and Technical Body 
plays a central role.  
Overall, it can be said that the ILBI will presumably have solid implementation and monitoring 
mechanisms in place. This stands in stark contrast to OSPAR, which is essentially lacking any 
kind of such mechanisms. It will have to be seen how this works in practice, once ABMTs, 
including MPAs, are established under the ILBI, but judging from the contours of the legal 
framework that is emerging it seems like at least the basic mechanisms will be significantly 
stronger. A major strength of the ILBI, as opposed to OSPAR, is the expected involvement of 
a Scientific and Technical Body throughout the MPA-process. This body provides independent 
 
294 Revised draft, supra note 199, Article 53. 
295 2016 MPA Status report, supra note 141, par. 3.7, 46. 
296 OSPAR Recommendation 2010/13 on the Management of the Charlie-Gibbs South Marine Protected Area. 
296 Ibid., Article 3.3.3 (d). 
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advice and overlooks implementation and monitoring, whilst not being bound by national 
interests or political views.  
6.4 Enforcement and Compliance 
The designation of MPAs does not automatically equate with effective management of human 
activities affecting the marine environment.297 ‘Paper parks’ are no uncommon phenomenon, 
especially in ABNJ.298 Weak enforcement mechanisms are often an important cause of this, as 
has been shown by a case study with 15 Italian MPAs. Only the 3 MPAs that were effectively 
being enforced showed positive ecological responses.299 Although the circumstances of this 
case study were different, since they are all located within national jurisdiction, it is nonetheless 
illustrative for the importance of effective enforcement. 
It is therefore regrettable that OSPAR and the BBNJ ILBI both lack such mechanisms. Both 
OSPAR and the ILBI rely heavily – or perhaps more appropriately, exclusively, on flag State 
jurisdiction. As shown in chapter 2, it has long been a fundamental principle of customary 
international law that the flag State has exclusive jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag. This 
principle is in line with the existing legal regime in ABNJ, which in essence revolves around 
the freedom of the high seas. However, this enforcement regime is arguably ill-suited for the 
new regime in ABNJ that is currently being created. A new regime, which further narrows down 
the high seas freedoms (a process that has been going on for quite some time)300 should be 
accompanied by an alteration of the enforcement regime. Although negotiations are ongoing, it 
seems certain that this will not happen. This is regrettable, since enforcement and compliance 
mechanisms give a legal instrument teeth - and without them, obligations may be left hull. 
Especially in regard to ABMTs, including MPAs, leaving compliance fully to the goodwill of 
the member States could be a bad idea, keeping in mind the spatial and material scope of the 
ILBI. It can be expected that compliance will be low, given the lack of (economic) national 
interest that States have in MPAs that lie beyond their jurisdiction.  
 
297 Matz-Lück N, Fuchs J, supra note 74, see also: Pieraccini M, Coppa S and Lucia GAD, “Beyond Marine 
Paper Parks? Regulation Theory to Assess and Address Environmental Non-Compliance” (2016) 27 Aquatic 
Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems 178. 
298 Rife AN et al, “When Good Intentions Are Not Enough … Insights on Networks of ‘Paper Park’ Marine 
Protected Areas” (2012) 6 Conservation Letters, 200. 
299 Guidetti P et al, “Italian Marine Reserve Effectiveness: Does Enforcement Matter?” (2008) 141 Biological 
Conservation 701. 
300 For an in-depth discussion of creeping coastal State jurisdiction in ABNJ, see: R Warner, R Rayfuse, 
‘Securing a Sustainable Future for the Oceans beyond National Jurisdiction: The Legal Basis for an Integrated 
Cross-Sectoral Regime for High Seas Governance for the 21st Century’ (2008) 23 The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 408. 
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As the ILBI will not alter the principle of exclusive flag State jurisdiction, the existing legal 
obstacles for OSPAR to enforce measures taken in ABNJ, will remain. However, even within 
this framework, a variety of tools are already available. 
For instance, satellite technology can be used to monitor the position of vessels. Vessel 
monitoring systems (VMS) are already widely used in fisheries management301 and could be 
equally valuable when used in relation to MPAs in ABNJ. The value of satellite tracking 
systems in relation to MPAs has been shown by WWF at the 2013 OSPAR ICG-MPA meeting. 
WWF presented a document on the use of satellite Automated Information System (s-AIS)302 
data as a tool to check compliance with bottom gear closures in OSPAR MPAs in ABNJ.303 
The results indicated that there may be bottom fishing activities taking place at the Josephine 
seamount complex, which is also a closed area under NEAFC.304 
Another effective enforcement tool that does not contradict the principle of exclusive flag State 
jurisdiction in ABNJ, are port State measures. Port States are granted far-reaching enforcement 
jurisdiction over vessels that are voluntarily in their ports, pursuant to article 218 UNCLOS. 
Although in and on itself this is already a useful tool for individual States, it has been shown in 
practice that through regional cooperation, more can be achieved. The Paris MoU305 is a 
prominent example of successful regional cooperation, building upon article 218 UNCLOS. 
The MoU is essentially a formalized cooperation between 27 States, committing themselves to 
maintain an effective system of port State control with a view to enhance compliance of foreign 
merchant vessels with the standards laid down in 17 different global instruments.306 Port 
inspections are intensified to achieve a density rating of approximately 90 per cent of all ships 
using ports in the region.307  
As for compliance, the regimes of OSPAR and BBNJ are, again, similar – and rather ‘soft’. As 
was observed in chapter 3, the OSPAR Commission can merely assist Parties to carry out their 
obligations. It has been observed that, as far as can be derived from OSPAR’s Commission 
 
301 FAO, ‘Technical guidelines for responsible fisheries 4’ suppl. 4: .Marine protected areas and fisheries (2011) 
par. 7.3. 
302 AIS is very similar to VMS, but instead used for collision avoidance, identification and location information 
(source: https://www.orbcomm.com/en/networks/satellite-ais, accessed 1 August 2020). 
303 ICG-MPA 2013 (1) par. 5.14. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, Including 42nd Amendment (adopted 17 May 
2019, in force 21 December 2019). 
306 Ibid., section 1. 
307 Kiehne G, “Investigation, Detention and Release of Ships under the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on 




meetings, this mechanism has not been used. For the ILBI, it can be expected that if there will 
be a provision on compliance (since several strong delegations, like the US, are reluctant about 
this), it will most likely merely allow the COP to offer advice and assistance. It seems highly 
unlikely that such a mechanism will do wonders for compliance.  
6.5 Concluding remarks 
It has previously been shown that it is a complex task to establish, implement and enforce MPAs 
in ABNJ in the existing legal framework. Since the BBNJ ILBI will not significantly alter this 
framework, the question arises how effective and comprehensive MPA governance in ABNJ 
can be achieved. This chapter assessed and compared the regimes of OSPAR and the BBNJ 
ILBI, and several key issues that can contribute to this end have been identified. In each of the 
stages of MPA governance, it has been shown that both instruments have their strengths and 
weaknesses.  
Negotiating delegations at the BBNJ negotiations should look at regional and sectoral bodies 
that are establishing ABMTs and MPAs, and learn from them. OSPAR forms a prime example, 
since it has been creating and implementing MPAs in ABNJ for over a decade. Although much 
more work is to be done, and its MPA network is far from perfect, the weaknesses of this regime 
are perhaps form even more valuable lessons than its strengths.  
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess how synergies can be created between OSPAR and the 
BBNJ ILBI, in order to achieve effective and comprehensive MPA governance in ABNJ. 
Several key issues that contribute to this endeavor have been identified: 
A positive approach to cooperation should be taken, instead of ‘not to undermine’ 
It has been shown that all institutional models of the ILBI (global, hybrid and regional) have 
the potential to strengthen regional bodies and instruments – albeit in different ways. This 
conclusion calls for a fundamentally different approach to the ongoing discussions about the 
institutional arrangements of the ILBI. Instead of being overly cautious of duplicating 
mandates and ‘undermining’ existing bodies, States should instead focus on realizing the 
potential of the ILBI to complement and ultimately strengthen these bodies. This is not an 
easy task, given the complexity and fragmentation of the existing legal framework. One 
crucial element in the ILBI that will for a large part be decisive for whether this can be 
achieved, is to take a more positive approach to the cooperation with existing bodies. The 
phrase ‘not to undermine’ should be abandoned, and the treaty provisions on cooperation 
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should instead embrace more positive phrasing that focus on complementarity, compatibility 
and mutual support.  
A recognition mechanism for existing MPAs should be included in the ILBI 
One of the weaknesses of OSPAR’s current MPA regime in ABNJ is that conservation 
measures in these MPAs can only be imposed on its CPs. For this reason, it is very desirable 
for OSPAR that the ILBI contains a mechanism through which its existing MPA can be 
recognized, preferably in the form of automatic recognition. This cannot be seen separately 
from the conclusion drawn above, since recognition of existing MPAs is one of the key 
elements that must be included in the ILBI for it to strengthen OSPAR’s efforts in ABNJ. 
Moreover, some legal hurdles have been identified that must be overcome in order to include 
such a mechanism.  
Scientific inputs should be woven in to all stages of the MPA process 
One important element of transparent MPA governance is the inclusion of scientific inputs 
throughout the processes of establishing and monitoring MPAs. Two advantages of this have 
been identified: Firstly, this avoids excessive ‘politization’ of the MPA regime, and secondly 
to enhance transparency and acceptance from the general public. Whereas OSPAR attributes a 
very marginal role to science in its MPA regime, it has been shown the ILBI will presumably 
have a Scientific and Technical Body that will assess proposals. Although it is arguably a 
missed opportunity that this Body will most likely not have to competence to identify sites 
and make proposals, its mere existence is one of the potential strengths of the MPA regime of 
the forthcoming BBNJ treaty. It would be a major improvement of OSPAR’s MPA regime if 
collaboration with ICES would be intensified, by – for example, allowing ICES to identify 
potential MPA-sites and assess proposals.  
NGOs should be allowed as Observers to the ILBI 
It has been shown that NGOs play an important role in OSPAR’s MPA regime, by identifying 
sites and making proposals. The legal basis for their involvement is, however, rather loose. It 
is merely provided in the Convention that NGOs are allowed to attend Commission meetings 
as Observers, and that they can provide information. This shows that such a legal basis is 
sufficient for NGOs to have a very positive influence on an MPA regime. In the view of the 
author, a similar model should therefore be adopted in the BBNJ ILBI. Three potential 
benefits of this have been identified: It creates a better balance of interests; it takes away some 
of the workload from the member States; and it will lead to more proposals being made.  
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Enforcement is key to effective MPAs that achieve their objectives 
It has been shown that OSPAR lacks enforcement mechanisms of any kind, and the same is 
expected for the ILBI. This is not surprising, since international treaties and conventions 
generally do not contain such a mechanism. However, in the author’s view, in the case of 
MPAs in ABNJ, it is of vital importance to include some type of enforcement scheme, for two 
reasons. Firstly, due to the material scope of the ILBI, which creates very little (if any) 
economic incentives for States to complies to measures taken in MPAs in ABNJ. Secondly, 
due to the spatial scope of the ILBI - given the legal regime of ABNJ, where the high seas 
freedoms prevail and flag State enforcement is the only available enforcement tool. It has, 
however, been shown that several enforcement tools are already available that are not being 
utilized.  
Although this thesis has only looked at the North-East Atlantic, these findings could nonetheless 
be useful for other regional instruments. Notwithstanding the fact that ecological, legal, and 
political circumstances may differ significantly in other regions, all regional instruments 
operate within the same overarching framework of UNCLOS. Moreover, the ILBI does not 
distinguish between different regional bodies, but offers a framework that is to be applied in all 
areas beyond national jurisdiction. The author would thus argue that the ILBI has the potential 
to strengthen the MPA regime anywhere, not just in the North-East Atlantic. In fact, given that 
OSPAR is miles ahead of most regional instruments, it could be argued that other regions may 
even gain more from this. Moreover, the key issues that contribute to effective MPA governance 
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